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“I believe in corporations. They are indispensable instruments of 
our modern civilization; but . . . they should . . . act for the interests 
of the community as a whole.”1 
 Theodore Roosevelt 
INTRODUCTION 
The notion of corporations considering community interests is 
not new. As early as 1905, Roosevelt highlighted the need for 
corporations to align their interests with those of surrounding 
communities. Yet, despite his sound pronouncement, the 
misalignment present today between corporate and community 
interests continues to persist. 
A number of recent events highlight this ongoing conflict. It can 
be seen in the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, which contaminated 
the southern parts of the U.S.;2 in the continuing release of toxic 
sludge by Massey Energy Corporation into the water supply of 
eastern Kentucky and West Virginia;3 and in the environmental 
contamination of the rainforest by Texaco in Ecuador.4 However, 
one of the most compelling illustrations of a corporation explicitly  
 
 
 1. ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE & JOHN MICKLETHWAIT, THE COMPANY: A SHORT 
HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 182 (2003) (quoting President Theodore Roosevelt). 
 2. Jim Polson, BP Oil Still Ashore One Year After End of Gulf Spill, BLOOMBERG, July 
15, 2011, available at www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2011-07-15/bp-oil-still-washing-
ashore-one-year-after-end-of-gulf-spill.html. 
 3. Geraldine Sealey, Sludge Spill Pollutes Ky., W. Va. Waters: Worst Regional Disaster in 
Years, ABC NEWS, Oct. 23, 2002, available at abcnews.go.com/US/print?id=95285; Dylan 
Lovan, Inez Coal Slurry Spill: Toxic Sludge From Massey Facility Still Pollutes Kentucky Town a 
Decade After Disaster, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 10, 2010, available at 
www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/11/inez-coal-slurry-spill-
to_n_757900.html?view=print&comm_ref=false. 
 4. AMAZON WATCH, CHEVRONTOXICO: THE CAMPAIGN FOR JUSTICE IN ECUADOR 
(2012), available at http://chevrontoxico.com/about/amazon-watch-capaign. 
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choosing to disassociate itself from the interests of its operating 
community is that of Royal Dutch and Shell (“Shell”) in Nigeria. 
Shell has conducted oil exploration activities in the Niger Delta 
region of Nigeria for many years, much to the discontent of the local 
community, the Ogoni.5 In the late 1990s, the Ogoni community 
formally organized its oppositional efforts against Shell and, shortly 
thereafter, the Nigerian government threatened to execute some of 
the Ogoni leaders.6 Despite mounting pressure on Shell to intervene 
in the execution, it chose instead to publicly dissociate itself from the 
interests of the Ogoni.7 As Shell stated, a “commercial organization 
such as ours cannot and should not sit in judgment on [these] 
matters.”8 
Nevertheless, after the execution of the Ogoni leaders, Shell 
began to face international boycotts of its products9 and a host of 
lawsuits for its alleged participation in the executions.10 Even today, 
Shell’s actions in the Ogoni community are under scrutiny as the 
Supreme Court decides liability in the highly publicized Kiobel 
case.11 Thus, despite a marked attempt to disassociate itself from the 
interests of its operating community, Shell’s corporate interests 
remain, at least partially, linked to the community’s fate. 
Shell’s and other corporations’ failures to align their interests 
with that of the community, in many ways, are indicative of the 
practice of separating issues of business from issues of the 
 
 5. For an account of Shell’s activities in the Niger Delta, see generally BRONWEN 
MANBY, CARNEGIE COUNCIL ON ETHICS AND INT’L AFFAIRS, SHELL IN NIGERIA: 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE OGONI CRISIS, CASE STUDY #20, (2000). 
 6. Id. at 5–6. 
 7. Rob Nixon, The Oil Weapon, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1995, at A31; Press Release, 
Shell Petroleum Development Company, Execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and His Co-
Defendants (November 14, 1995), available at http://crudeimpact.com/discuss-the-
issues/ken-saro-wiwa/execution-of-ken-saro-wiwa. 
 8. WILLIAM F. SCHULZ, IN OUR OWN BEST INTEREST: HOW DEFENDING HUMAN 
RIGHTS BENEFITS US ALL 68 (2001). 
 9. Mel Wilson & Rosie Lombardi, Globalization and its Discontents: The Arrival of 
Triple Bottom-Line Reporting, IVEY BUS. J., Sept.–Oct. 2001, available at 
http://www.iveybusinessjournal.com/topics/global-business/globalization-and-its-
discontents-the-arrival-of-triple-bottom-linereporting#.UH7GS2dJF0s. 
 10. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000). Along with 
Wiwa v. Andersen, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum was ultimately settled by Shell for $15.5 
million. A third lawsuit was dismissed: Wiwa v. Shell Petroleum Development Co., No. 04-cv-
02665-KMW-HBP (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2008). 
 11. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d in 
part and rev’d in part, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S.Ct. 472 (2011). 
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community. German scholar Ferdinand Tönnies has argued that the 
world is divided into a community or Gemeinschaft, as he terms it, 
and society or Gesellschaft, by which he means business or the 
commercial.12 For Tönnies, the separation of these two aspects of the 
world is so marked that he finds the notion of a corporate-
Gemeinschaft ”abominable.”13 For Tönnies, corporations that ignore 
or discount community issues are seemingly unable or unwilling to 
view corporations and communities as complements. 
Yet, there are a small but growing number of corporations that 
have adopted a contrary view. These corporations contend that 
corporate and community interests are not distinct but can, in some 
cases, be united. Corporations adopting this approach cite several 
advantages to this approach, including increased public trust in the 
company, development of local talent, easier recruitment of new 
employees, and sustainability of their investments.14 At the same 
time, communities in which this approach has been adopted view the 
investments in their community as sustainable and responsive to 
their interests. 
Given the mutual benefits to both corporations and communities 
that corporate consideration of community interests can bring, this 
Article argues that corporations should adopt a proactive stance to 
community interests. In particular, it contends that corporations 
should leverage their core business capabilities to foster the 
sustainable interests of the community in consultation with the 
community. In doing so, it rejects Tönnies’ abhorrence of a 
corporate-community relationship and instead proposes a novel 
approach to corporate governance that views the relationship 
between corporations and community as symbiotic—a redefined 
 
 12. FERDINAND TÖNNIES, COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY 34 (Charles P. Loomis trans., 
2011). 
 13. Id. The late 18th century, when Tönnies first drew a distinction between 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, was a time of growing industrialization and urbanization. 
Tönnies’ observations were made as he despaired the growing shift from a community-based 
society towards a commercial-based society in which self-interest would dominate. Whereas 
membership in a Gemeinschaft would entail a member serving the interests of the group, 
membership in a Gesellschaft was instrumental: membership in the group would only be useful 
insofar as it furthered his individual goals. For this reason, Tönnies could not envision a 
Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft as they would be antithetical to each other’s purposes. 
 14. THE CONFERENCE BOARD, INC., BUILDING THE CORPORATE COMMUNITY 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TEAM 12 (1998); A.M. Esteves, Mining and Social Development: 
Refocusing Community Investment Using Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis, 33 RESOURCES 
POL’Y. 39, 40 (2008). 
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Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft to borrow Tönnies’ terms. Under this view, 
corporate decision-making for community interests is premised on 
aligning and fostering both the interests of corporations and the 
interests of communities.  
This Article’s approach does not wholly adopt either 
contractarianism or stakeholder theory, the two dominant theories of 
corporate governance.15 Instead, this Article makes a distinctive 
contribution to the literature in the area by proposing that 
corporations identify with their operating communities as a means of 
fostering sustainable community interests. Drawing from social 
identity theory, it contends that corporations that adopt the 
“identity” of the communities in which they operate are better able 
to adhere to the values and norms of the community. As a result, 
identification can offer the basis under which corporate fostering of 
community interests gives rise to sustainable impacts on the 
community rather than a mere public relations exercise. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces and defines the 
notion of community and describes the importance and the 
idiosyncratic nature of the relationship between corporations and 
communities. It concludes by exploring the shortcomings of existing 
models for governing corporate community relations. Part II begins 
to develop the Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach to corporate 
governance for community interests by revisiting the two dominant 
strands of corporate governance theories, contractarianism and 
stakeholder theory, and examines their advantages and 
disadvantages. It then goes on to describe the Gesellschaft-
Gemeinschaft approach, its benefits, and how it draws from, but fails 
to wholly adopt, both dominant corporate governance theories. 
Part III turns to a discussion of aligning corporate community 
interests by having the corporation identify with the operating 
community. This Part provides a brief overview of social identity 
theory before exploring three case studies in which corporations have 
sought to identify with the communities in which they operate. It 
concludes by exploring the benefits of corporate identification with 
the operating community. Finally, Part IV turns to explore methods 
by which corporate-community interest alignment can be regulated. 
It explores both public regulation and self-regulation as possible 
 
 15. David K. Millon, Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 46 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 523, 523–25 (2011). 
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mechanisms and concludes that a hybrid system may be best to 
facilitate a Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach to corporate decision-
making. 
I. CORPORATIONS AND COMMUNITIES 
While many corporations—like Shell in Nigeria—have chosen 
to dismiss or discount community interests, there have been a 
number of different efforts taken to ensure a more harmonious 
relationship between corporations and communities. Before 
reviewing existing corporate-community governance 
mechanisms, however, it may be prudent to begin by defining 
the term “community” and examining the importance and 
uniqueness of corporate-community relationships. 
A. What is the Community? 
The Oxford dictionary defines the term “community” as a group 
of people living in the same place or having common interests or 
attitudes.16 Community sociologists argue, however, that community 
cannot be ascribed such a basic definition. One highly noted study in 
the field found, for instance, that there are over ninety competing 
definitions of the term “community” with the only commonality 
between the definitions being that they dealt with people.17 
German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies’ 1887 book, 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft (“Community and Society”), a pioneer 
in community studies, offers a starting point for defining the term 
“community.”18 Tönnies defines Gemeinschaft as a small, close-knit 
community unified by shared experiences, values, and norms.19 He 
contrasts this against Gesellschaft, or large-scale, impersonal, 
commercial society, linked only by the transactions involved in the 
pursuit of individual self-interests.20 For Tönnies then, a community 
is marked by unified values and norms and is antithetical to the 
notion of pursuit of rational self-interest. 
 
 16. OXFORD DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ 
english/community?q=community (last visited Jan. 10, 2014). 
 17. See generally George A. Hillery, Definitions of Community: Areas of Agreement, 20 
RURAL SOCIOLOGY 111 (1955). 
 18. TÖNNIES, supra note 12. 
 19. FERDINAND TÖNNIES, TÖNNIES: COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY xli 
(Jose Harris ed., 2001).  
 20. Id. 
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Building on the work of Tönnies, modern community 
sociologists have further subdivided the types of communities.21 
Among these types of communities are “community of place”—
defined by the physical proximity of the members—and “community 
of interest,” which includes members who share the same interests 
but are not necessarily in physical proximity to each other.22 
One scholar has argued, however, that the notion of community 
cannot be defined so precisely. Instead, he contends that the 
definition of community should be fluid. As Kapelus observes: 
[C]ommunities can be identified on the basis of any number of 
shared traits such as geographic territory, religion, culture, history, 
kinship, etc. . . . [P]eople can have multiple, overlapping identities 
and these identities can change overtime [sic]. This means that any 
definition of a community is always a construct, an imposing of 
order that does not necessarily fit the lived experience of the people 
in question . . . . [D]ifferent definitions based upon different 
criteria include and exclude different people.23 
Randels, however, prefers to define a community as a framework. 
As he notes, a community is a “framework of shared beliefs, interests, 
and commitments unit[ing] a set of varied groups and activities . . . 
that establish a common . . . fate, . . . a sense of belonging, and a 
supportive structure of activities and relationships.”24 
While no one definition of community is authoritative, by 
distilling the common elements that appear from each of these 
definitions, a broad definition of the term “community” begins to 
emerge. Accordingly, a community is a group of people who are 
generally proximate to each other either in location or interests, 
share values and norms, possess a common culture or identity, or 
 
 21. Laura Dunham, R. Edward Freeman & Jeanne Liedtka, The Soft Underbelly of 
Stakeholder Theory: The Role of Community 11 (Darden Bus. Sch., Working Paper No.01-22, 
2001). 
 22. Id. at 12–13. 
 23. Paul Kapelus, Mining, Corporate Social Responsibility and the “Community”: The 
Case of Rio Tinto, Richards Bay Minerals and The Mbonambi, 39 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 275, 281 
(2002). 
 24. George D. Randels, Jr., Loyalty, Corporations, and Community, 11 BUS. ETHICS Q. 
27, 35 (2001) (alteration in original) (emphasis removed) (quoting PHILIP SELZNICK, THE 
MORAL COMMONWEALTH. SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY 358–59 
(1992)). 
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share a common fate. A community may possess only one of these 
attributes or some combination of all of them.25 
B. The Importance of Corporate-Community Relationships 
Having defined “community,” we now turn to examine the 
importance of corporate-community relationships. Corporate social 
responsibility literature is rife with references to community interests 
yet, for the most part, the individual importance of the corporate-
community relationship has not been given much importance. 
Instead, the need for corporations to consider community interests 
has usually been consolidated with the interests of a wide variety of 
other corporate constituents—creditors, employees, and suppliers, 
for instance—suggesting that the community’s interests are 
comparable to the interests of these other stakeholders.26 
However, in many instances, the corporate-community 
relationship is very different from a corporation’s relationship with 
other stakeholders. This is in part because communities—unlike 
creditors, employees, and suppliers—usually lack the ability to 
negotiate their relationship with the corporation.27 As the residents 
of the Niger Delta or Louisiana communities can attest, their 
relationship with Shell and BP, respectively, was involuntary.28 
At the same time, although communities do not necessarily 
willingly enter into relationships with the corporation, it is the 
community that is most directly affected when corporations engage 
in adverse acts.29 For instance, while a corporation’s gas leak will 
 
 25. A government, however, is not a proxy for a community. As Dunham et al. note, 
“[g]overnment, while it derives its legitimacy from community, cannot be equated with 
community.” Dunham et al., supra note 21, at 13. 
 26. For instance, Blair and Stout argue in their team production model that a 
corporation depends upon the firm-specific investments of numerous stakeholders, including 
shareholders, employees, creditors, and communities, seemingly suggesting that the interests of 
these stakeholders are comparable. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team 
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999). 
 27. As the government of a country cannot be equated to a local community, even if a 
government negotiates with a corporation to locate its operations in a particular community, 
the community does not necessarily consent to the corporation’s presence. See Dunham et al, 
supra note 21, at 13. 
 28. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability 
for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1920 (1991). As Hansmann and Kraakman observe, 
“[t]ort victims, unlike contract creditors, cannot assess the potential credit-worthiness of a 
corporation before they are injured,” making them “involuntary creditors.” Id. 
 29. Kapelus, supra note 23, at 280. 
DO NOT DELETE 7/14/2014  3:47 PM 
257 Aligning Corporate and Community Interests 
 265 
inevitably damage its relationships with its employees, creditors, and 
even shareholders, it is the community that will most heavily bear 
the consequences.30 
The corporate-community relationship also differs from the 
corporation’s relationship with other stakeholders since in some cases 
the collective action power of the community to interfere with the 
corporation’s operations far exceeds that of creditors, employees, or 
suppliers. Indeed, in some cases, communities have been able to 
completely halt the operations of large multinational corporations.31 
Fostering good relations with the community can, in some cases, 
therefore, be integral to the overall viability of corporate operations. 
Furthermore, good corporate-community relations can reduce 
costs for the corporation. Corporations that possess good 
relationships with their operating communities face less community 
disruptions or protests.32 As one corporation observed, good 
community relations “cut down” on lead time, disputes, and project 
delays.33 Fostering community interests can also save corporations 
indirect costs that arise from charges from external environmental or 
labor groups.34 Indeed, corporations that can convincingly evidence 
that the community is benefiting from its operations are provided 
with a “cloak of legitimacy that serves to protect them from charges” 
from outside interest groups.35 Corporate attention to community 
interests can also serve to increase the legitimacy of the corporation 
 
 30. For example, in the Bhopal disaster, forty tons of toxin leaked out of Union Carbide 
Co.’s pesticide factory and settled over the local community in Bhopal, killing 3,500 people 
within days and more than 15,000 since the incident occurred in 1984. See Bhopal Trial: Eight 
Convicted Over India Gas Disaster, BBC NEWS (last updated June 7, 2010), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8725140.stm. 
 31. For instance, both the Tambogrande community in Peru and the Esquel community 
in Argentina were able to completely halt two giant mining corporations from commencing 
operations in their community. See Peru |Tambogrande: Manhattan Minerals, EARTHWORKS 
(last visited Oct. 3, 2012), 
http://www.earthworksaction.org/voices/detail/tambogrande_voice; Marcela Valente, 
Argentina: Local Opponents of Mine Sued by Meridian Gold, INTER PRESS SERVICE NEWS 
AGENCY (Feb. 15, 2007), http://www.ipsnews.net/2007/02/argentina-local-opponents-of-
mine-sued-by-meridian-gold. 
 32. Dunham et al., supra note 21, at 5. 
 33. Kapelus, supra note 23, at 285. 
 34. Dunham et al., supra note 21, at 5. 
 35. Kapelus, supra note 23, at 280; see also Dunham et al., supra note 21, at 5. 
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with governments facilitating governmental permits and consent to 
future projects.36 
C. Governing the Relationship Between Corporations and 
Communities 
Given the importance of positive relations between corporations 
and communities, it is not surprising that rules governing corporate 
activities authorize corporate consideration of community interests. 
For example, the American Law Institute’s (ALI) Principles of 
Corporate Governance observe that corporations create 
“interdependencies” with groups such as members of the 
communities in which the corporation operates and sanction the 
subordination of short-term profits to maintain community 
interests.37 Similarly, state constituency statutes, which enable 
corporate managers to consider non-economic interests when faced 
with a takeover bid, also permit corporations to consider community 
interests.38 Courts have also recognized the discretion given to 
directors to consider community interests.39 However, neither the 
ALI principles nor constituency statutes nor courts mandate 
corporate consideration of community interests. In fact, the one 
constituency statute that obliged directors to consider community 
interests was recently amended and rephrased in the permissive.40 
Conversely, the recently revised OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises have attempted to impose positive duties 
on corporations in relation to communities. The Guidelines state 
that corporations should encourage local capacity by working with 
the local community,41 implement self-regulatory practices in order 
to foster a relationship of confidence and trust with the operating 
community,42 and “engage with relevant stakeholders” in order to be 
 
 36. Kapelus, supra note 23, at 287. 
 37. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 
2.01 cmt. f (1992). 
 38. For an overview of constituency statutes, see Barnali Choudhury, Serving Two 
Masters: Incorporating Social Responsibility into the Corporate Paradigm, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
631, 644–45 (2009). 
 39. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
 40. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756 (West 2010). 
 41. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD GUIDELINES FOR 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 19 (2011), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/29/48004323.pdf (Guideline A(3)). 
 42. Id. (Guideline A(7)). 
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able to take into account their views in planning.43 Nevertheless, as 
the Guidelines are not legally enforceable and contain only 
recommendations aimed at creating a best practices guide for 
corporations, their influence over corporate decision-making vis-à-vis 
community interests remains mainly aspirational.44 
Several industry groups have also advocated in favor of corporate 
consideration of community interests. Under the Equator Principles, 
for instance, certain lending institutions involved in project financing 
recommend that corporations engage with the community.45 The 
Forest Stewardship Council adopts a comparable approach, requiring 
corporations to obtain community consent for certain forest 
operations.46 
More recently, both the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC), the private sector arm of the World Bank, and the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) have adopted a 
mandatory approach to corporate consideration of community 
interests. The IFC, for instance, requires that corporations operating 
projects that it funds adhere to community-focused performance 
standards.47 Although the IFC acknowledges the role of public 
authorities in protecting public health and security, it mandates that 
corporations “avoid or minimize the risks and impacts to community 
health, safety, and security that may arise from project related-
activities, with particular attention to vulnerable groups.”48 
Similarly, the EBRD requires that corporations whose projects 
involve impacts on traditional or customary lands under use, cultural 
 
 43. Id. at 20 (Guideline A(14)). 
 44. For example, Goldcorp Corporation in Guatemala has repeatedly violated these 
community interest guidelines without facing repercussions. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION AND DEV., ANNUAL REPORT ON THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES 2011: A NEW AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE 55–60 (2011), available at 
http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/governance/annual-report-on-
the-oecd-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises-2011_mne-2011-en.  
 45. EQUATOR PRINCIPLES ASS’N, THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES 1, 3, 4 (2006), available 
at http://www.equator-principles.com/resources/equator_principles.pdf. 
 46. FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, FSC PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA FOR FOREST 
STEWARDSHIP 5 (2002), available at https://ca.fsc.org/download.principles- -  
(Principle 2.2). 
 47. INT’L FIN. CORP., IFC PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY 27 (2012), available at http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/ 
c8f524004a73daeca09afdf998895a12/IFC_Performance_Standards.pdf?MOD=AJPERES 
(Performance Standard 4). 
 48. Id. 
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resources, or resettlement of communities, obtain the prior consent 
of the community to the project.49 As part of the process of 
obtaining the community’s consent to the project, the corporation is 
mandated, first, “to avoid adverse effects” and second, to minimize 
and mitigate any potential adverse impacts.50 
While the IFC and ERBD’s policies foster a more stringent 
approach to corporate consideration of community interests, they are 
limited in their scope. Both policies only pertain to projects funded 
by these institutions. In addition, the ERBD only mandates its 
community consent policy for certain specified projects and only for 
projects that affect indigenous communities.51 Thus, to date there 
remains an absence of an industry-neutral, overarching governance 
approach to corporate consideration of community interests. 
II. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE THEORIES AND COMMUNITY 
INTERESTS 
While the value of corporate consideration of community 
interests is discernible from the myriad of existing corporate-
community governance mechanisms, it is unclear why most of the 
mechanisms have taken a relatively lax approach to the issue. A 
possible answer is that they permit, but generally do not oblige, 
corporate consideration of community interests because they mirror 
the ambiguous approach of corporate law. While the debate over 
whether the purpose of the corporation is to serve shareholders’ 
interests exclusively or whether it is to serve the interests of a wider 
array of corporate constituents has persisted since the 1930’s,52 
corporate law has chosen an indeterminate position within the two 
sides of the debate, failing to wholly adopt either position.53 Existing 
 
 49. EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV., ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
SOCIAL POLICY 50 (2008), available at http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/ 
policies/2008policy.pdf (Performance Requirement 7). 
 50. Id. at 52. 
 51. EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV., INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: 
GUIDANCE NOTE 6 (2010), available at http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/ 
guides/indp.pdf. 
 52. This debate began in the pages of the Harvard Law Review between Berle and 
Dodd. See Adolf A. Berle Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1365 (1932); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 
HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932). 
 53. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 261 (1992); Choudhury, supra note 38, at 633. More recently, in 
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governance mechanisms for corporate-community relationships have, 
seemingly, continued this approach. 
To be sure, the lacuna in the law’s definition of corporate 
purpose has not prevented scholars from developing their own 
models. Today, scholarly literature on corporate governance falls 
essentially into one of two factions: contractarianism, which views 
corporations as vehicles of shareholder wealth maximization, and 
stakeholder theory, which both views corporations as public 
institutions that should serve more than the interests of shareholders 
and tends to equate the interests of shareholders with the interests of 
non-shareholders. 
Governing corporate-community relationships, however, does 
not necessarily fall into either existing faction. Corporate 
consideration of community interests may appear initially at odds 
with a concept of shareholder wealth maximization. However, it 
does not fall comfortably into a stakeholder theorists’ notion of 
equivalency between shareholders and non-shareholders. Instead, 
governing corporate-community relationships may best be achieved 
by aligning corporate-community interests in a manner that seeks to 
foster the interests of both the corporation and the community. The 
result is a corporation-community—or, to use Tönnies’ terms, a 
Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft—approach to decision-making. Under this 
approach, corporate decision-making in relation to community 
interests is premised on some of the advantages of both 
contractarianism and stakeholder theory while, at the same time, 
assuaging their shortcomings. However, to fully understand how a 
Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach differs from the two dominant 
theories, it may be useful to briefly review these theories and 
ascertain their principal benefits and flaws in the context of 
community interests. 
 
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010), the Delaware Chancery 
Court held that directors must act “to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of 
its stockholders,” suggesting that the debate of the corporate purpose had been resolved. Id. at 
60–61. Nevertheless, the court went on to acknowledge that directors could act to protect 
non-shareholder interests so long as the act benefits shareholder interests in the long run and 
noted that, under the business judgment rule, it would not scrutinize the benefits ultimately 
obtained by the shareholders. Id. at 57–58. Consequently, the eBay decision still allows 
considerable discretion for directors to pursue non-shareholder interests, thereby reinforcing 
corporate law’s agnostic position. 
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A. Contractarianism 
Contractarians view corporations as a “nexus of contracts,” a 
metaphor that represents the implicit and explicit voluntary 
arrangements that affected parties will work out among themselves.54 
Viewed in this manner, the corporation is seen not as a thing, but as 
a legal fiction representing the complex arrangements set up by those 
who provide inputs to the firm.55 The focus for contractarians is thus 
on private ordering, making freedom of contract essential, and 
limiting governmental intervention to enforcing private contacts.56 
An important implication of viewing the corporation as a “nexus 
of contracts” is that wealth maximization is the guiding norm of the 
corporation. Contractarians assume that wealth maximization is a 
“bargained-for term” of the shareholders’ contract with the 
corporation.57As one contractarian observed, shareholders will only 
provide equity capital to a corporation if “the directors are charged 
with managing the corporation so as to maximize shareholder 
wealth.”58 Contractarians also presume that other stakeholders 
similarly enter into voluntary bargains with the corporation, and they 
protect their interests by adjusting the contract price to account for 
the fact that corporate managers will not give primacy to 
their interests.59 
The problems with contractarianism arise principally because of 
its assumption of perfect market conditions under which the 
supposed voluntary bargaining between affected parties takes place. 
In truth, information asymmetries, unanticipated consequences, 
inequalities in bargaining power, ambiguities, and complexities may 
undercut the actual bargaining process that takes place between 
 
 54. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1416, 1426 (1989). 
 55. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 27 (2002). 
 56. For a good overview of this argument, see Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and 
the Securities Laws: Opting Out of Securities Regulation by Private Agreement, 56 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 519, 526 (1999). 
 57. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 3, 6–39, 92–93 (1991); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The 
Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 577–87 (2003). 
 58. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 55, at 58; David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate 
Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1, 3 
(Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995). 
 59. Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense Of The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: 
A Reply To Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1443 (1993). 
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affected parties.60 For example, communities “contracting” with a 
corporation to establish a branch or plant in its area may not be able 
to engage in an efficient bargain with the corporation because they 
cannot accurately anticipate the project’s unforeseen contingencies 
or do not fully understand its complexities.61 
Contractarians also fail to give considerable weight to the 
externalities that can be imposed on third parties because of 
contracts made between the corporation and a stakeholder. Thus, a 
contract between employees and the corporation to have a factory 
continue to operate despite significant safety problems fails to 
consider the externalities that will be imposed on the surrounding 
community if the factory’s safety problems spill over its four walls. 
The communities surrounding the Deepwater Platform in the BP oil 
spill or the city of Bhopal after the Union Carbide factory 
explosion,62 for example, are unlikely to have bargained to be a party 
to the externalities eventually imposed upon them. 
Moreover, while the wealth maximization mantra of a 
contractarian corporation prizes, and may maximize, the economic 
efficiency of corporations,63 it does so only in terms of the 
corporation’s status in the present. By choosing interests that favor 
wealth maximization over stakeholder interests, corporate managers 
may, in many instances, be making decisions within a temporal limit. 
Hedgefunds, for instance, are well-known for their ability to push 
corporate managers to make wealth-maximizing decisions in the 
short-run.64 A strict wealth maximization guiding norm therefore 
 
 60. Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, Corporate Governance in a Global. 
Environment: The Search for the Best of All Worlds, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 829, 836 
(2000); Christoph Loch & Svenja Sommer, Incomplete Incentive Contracts Under Ambiguity 
and Complexity, 1 (INSEAD Working Paper Series, 2003/72/TM, 2003), available at 
http://www.insead.edu/facultyresearch/research/doc.cfm?did=1305. 
 61. Loch and Sommer characterize ambiguities in contracts as the impossibility to 
recognize all influence variables and to foresee all possible events, and complexity as the 
difficulty to estimate the overall performance because of the interaction of many performance 
influence variables. Loch & Sommer, supra note 60, at 1. 
 62. For an overview of the Bhopal disaster, see 1984: Hundreds Die in Bhopal Chemical 
Accident, BBC NEWS (Dec. 3, 1984), http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/ 
stories/december/3/newsid_2698000/2698709.stm. 
 63. Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder 
Primacy, 31 J. OF CORP. L. 637, 656 (2006); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 57 at 38. 
 64. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, 155 U. PENN L. REV. 1021, 1083 (2007) (observing “hedge funds come 
close to being the archetypal short-term investor”); Battling for Corporate America, 
ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 2006, available at http://www.economist.com/node/5601741 
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forces corporate managers to consider only the immediate impacts of 
their decision, potentially constraining their ability to consider the 
long-term interests of the firm. Adoption of a contractarian view of 
corporations, and its ingrained wealth maximization norm, therefore 
can impede the long-term viability of the firm.65 In particular, a 
community in which a corporation operates that emphasizes short-
term decision-making driven exclusively by wealth generation can be 
compromised in terms of its sustainability.66 
However, even if managers adopt a long-term view of a wealth 
maximization norm, a number of problems persist. Most notably, 
although contractarians argue that wealth maximization will serve to 
further the interests of stakeholders by creating “a larger pie” from 
which stakeholders can take a larger serving,67 this notion is not 
supported by empirical evidence. Rather studies demonstrate that gains 
to shareholders are often a result of wealth transfers from other 
stakeholders.68 Thus, an exclusive wealth maximization norm, even if 
adopted on a long-run view, neither necessarily furthers the interests of  
 
 
 
 
(arguing that if rampaging shareholders scared bosses into short-term decisions, their 
companies would fail to make potentially crucial long-term investments). 
 65. Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy & Society: The Link Between 
Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV., 11 (Dec. 2006), 
available at http://www.salesforcefoundation.org/files/HBR-CompetiveAdvAndCSR.pdf. 
 66. Sustainability entails a community being able to meet the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. See U.N. 
WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 43 (1987). 
 67. Ronald Chen & Jon Hansen, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge 
Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1124 (2004) (for shareholders, 
legal economists focus on maximizing the size of the pie, a theoretical focus that is said to 
maximize the pie for all constituencies); David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. 
REV. 223, 241 (1991) (One could safely assume that corporate profitability would benefit 
nonshareholders as well as shareholders. Especially in times of general prosperity, larger pies 
imply larger servings for all.). 
 68. See, e.g., Andrei Schliefer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile 
Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (Alan J. Auerbach 
ed. 1988). See also RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF 
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, 610 (2d ed. 1995); Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, 
Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate 
Governance, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 219, 234 (2009). 
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the community or other corporate stakeholders and may result in little 
or no overall efficiency gains.69 
At the same time, contractarianism offers some advantages. For 
one, it facilitates corporate decision-making. Because corporate 
managers are driven only by a need to maximize wealth, there is no 
need to take into account the multiple interests of a variety of 
stakeholders. Corporate managers, therefore, do not have to weigh 
shareholder interests against stakeholder interests; do not have to 
determine whether shareholder or stakeholder’s interests should 
prevail if they conflict; and do not decide which of the variety of 
stakeholder interests should prevail if the interests between 
stakeholders and themselves conflict. 
Second, a contractarian view of corporations can reduce agency 
costs.70 As Bainbridge argues, a wealth maximization norm ensures 
that corporate managers do not pursue their “own self-interest by 
playing shareholders off against non-shareholders.”71 
Third, contractarianism offers an easier standard by which to 
ascertain the effectiveness of corporate decision-making. Assessing 
whether a corporation has increased its wealth is easily determined by 
examining objective numerical data. In comparison, since there is no 
common standard by which to assess whether a corporation has 
furthered the interests of the environment or society, determining 
whether corporate decision-making has been effective in these areas 
remains speculative and prone to manipulation.72 
Finally, adhering to an exclusive wealth maximization norm 
enables corporate managers to focus on the generation of profits. If 
in so doing it does not generate externalities or result in perpetual 
wealth transfers from stakeholders to shareholders, continual profit 
 
 69. See generally Schliefer & Summers, supra note 68. The authors argue that 
shareholder gains in takeovers often come at the expense of employees’ employment and wage 
losses, meaning that net gains to society from a takeover may be small or non-existent. 
 70. Agency costs relate to divergences of interest between the principal and the agent 
and are the sum of the contracting cost, the principal’s monitoring cost (the cost to monitor 
the agent), the bonding cost by the agent (payments to the agent to protect against the agent’s 
deviations from the principal’s interest), and residual loss (reduction in principal’s welfare due 
to divergences). See MICHAEL C. JENSEN AND WILLIAM H. MECKLING, THEORY OF THE 
FIRM: MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR, AGENCY COSTS AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 5–6 (1976).  
 71. Bainbridge, supra note 59, at 1427, 1435, 1438. See also EASTERBROOK & 
FISCHEL, supra note 57, at 38; Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and 
Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2001). 
 72. Pascual Berrone & Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, The Pros and Cons of Rewarding Social 
Responsibility at the Top, 48:6 HUMAN RESOURCE MGMT. 959, 965 (2009). 
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generation will help to ensure the economic viability of 
the corporation. 
B. Stakeholder Theory 
While contractarians argue that shareholder interests should 
prevail over all other interests, stakeholder theorists contend that 
corporate managers should consider not only the interests of 
shareholders, but also the interests of a variety of corporate 
constituents, the so-called stakeholders. The reasons for this 
conclusion are varied, and unlike contractarianism, do not draw from 
a unified theory. 
Consideration of stakeholder interests is, for instance, justified by 
viewing the corporation as a social or public institution,73 as an entity 
capable of doing both good and harm,74 or as a moral organism.75 
Alternatively, commentators argue that stakeholder interests should 
factor into corporate decision-making because stakeholders are 
constituent elements of the overall corporation,76 because of the need 
to maximize social welfare,77 because otherwise shareholders can inflict 
harms on stakeholders,78 or because the “legal, economic, political and 
moral challenges” to the current nexus of contracts view of the firm 
require it.79 The need for corporate managers to consider stakeholder 
 
 73. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 46 (2d ed. 1968); Thomas Lee Hazen, The Corporate Persona, Contract 
(And Market) Failure, and Moral Values, 69 N.C. L. REV. 273, 309 (1991); David K. Millon, 
New Directions in Corporate Law Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate 
Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1379 (1993). 
 74. Michael Bradley et al., The Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation in 
Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 
41–47 (1999). 
 75. William Bradford, Beyond Good and Evil: The Commensurability of Corporate Profits 
and Human Rights, 26 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB POL’Y 141, 148 (2012). 
 76. Millon, supra note 15, at 525; Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, A Statutory 
Model for Corporate Constituency Concerns, 49 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1090 (2000). 
 77. Kent Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder Governance, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1043, 
1055 (2008). 
 78. Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders, Changing Metaphors of Corporate 
Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409, 1417 (1993). 
 79. R. EDWARD FREEMAN, A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation, in ETHICAL 
THEORY & BUSINESS 39 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E Bowie eds., 6th ed. 2001). 
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interests has even been justified under a modified “nexus of contracts” 
view of corporations.80 
In any case, regardless of the underlying theory justifying 
stakeholder theory, stakeholders are unanimous in arriving at three 
arguments. First, corporate managers should consider the interests of 
stakeholders; second, wealth maximization should not be an 
overriding concern guiding corporate decision-making;81 and third, 
corporate managers should balance the interests of all stakeholders, 
including shareholders, against each other.82 
The benefits of stakeholder theory, at first glance, appear 
overwhelming. Corporations that consider and balance stakeholder 
interests in their corporate decision-making are less likely to inflict 
externalities on third parties,83 more likely to foster greater stability 
in the economy,84 more likely to treat others ethically,85 and are 
further inclined to encourage firm-specific investments from 
stakeholders and discourage opportunistic behavior.86 There is 
seemingly no disadvantage to creating a means by which 
corporations have a greater predisposition to “improve the quality of 
people’s lives beyond what they can bargain for.”87 
Contractarians are, however, quick to point out stakeholder 
theory’s shortcomings. As Bainbridge argues, adopting a multi-
fiduciary approach to corporate decision-making falls afoul of two 
problems that he terms “two masters” and “managerial sins.” The 
“two masters” problem arises in situations when it is impossible to 
protect non-shareholders from harm without advancing shareholder 
 
 80. Blair and Stout reformulate the nexus of contracts theory to argue that a 
corporation is a “nexus of firm-specific investments.” See Blair & Stout, supra note 26, at 275, 
285. Without arguing per se in favor of promoting the interests of stakeholders, Blair and 
Stout’s Team Production theory concludes that corporate managers must consider the interests 
of stakeholders who have made firm-specific investments. Id. at 286. 
 81. John Kaler, Differentiating Stakeholder Theories, 46 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 71, 71 
(2003). 
 82. Blair & Stout, supra note 26 at 281; FREEMAN, supra note 79, at 44; Bradford, 
supra note 75, at 149. 
 83. Green, supra note 78, at 1417. 
 84. Greenfield, supra note 77, at 1058. 
 85. Timothy L. Fort, The Corporation as Mediating Institution: An Efficacious Synthesis 
of Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Constituency Statutes, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 173 at 
176. 
 86. Blair & Stout, supra note 26, at 271. 
 87. Millon, supra note 15, at 1389. 
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interests.88 In an “irreconcilable conflict” between shareholder and 
non-shareholder interests, stakeholder proponents suggest that 
management make trade-offs between the two groups or even 
subordinate profit goals in order to further non-shareholder 
interests.89 For Bainbridge, this proposal is problematic as it transfers 
wealth from shareholders to non-shareholders and perpetuates the 
managerial sins problem.90 
Stakeholder theory critics also argue that the stakeholder 
approach further raises problems of agency costs, or what Bainbridge 
terms the “managerial sins” problem. The principal critique is that 
by releasing corporate managers from a wealth maximization norm, 
management can play different corporate constituents off one 
another in an effort to pursue their own self-interest.91 That is, 
corporate managers will make decisions that primarily benefit their 
own interest and then use any of a myriad of corporate constituents 
whose interests are reflected in their decision to justify the decision 
taken.92 As Roe argues, the stakeholder approach “could leave 
managers so much discretion that [they] . . . maximize neither 
shareholder, employee, consumer, nor national wealth, but only their 
own.”93 
Critics charge that stakeholder theory faces a number of 
additional shortcomings. These include its failure to assign relative 
weights to the interests of the various stakeholders,94 to devise a 
method by which conflicts between shareholders and non-
shareholders or between non-shareholders themselves can be 
resolved,95 to offer an operational framework by which corporate 
managers can make decisions on a day-to-day basis,96 and to define 
 
 88. Bainbridge, supra note 59, at 1435. See also Fort, supra note 85, at 173, 180. 
 89. Bainbridge, supra note 59, at 1419, 1435. 
 90. Id. at 1433. 
 91. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing 
Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 581 (1992); Bainbridge, supra note 59, 
at 1438; Roe, supra note 71, at 2065. 
 92. Bainbridge, supra note 59, at 1438 (“When management’s interests coincide with 
those of shareholders, management could justify its decision by saying that shareholder 
interests prevailed in this instance, and vice-versa.”). 
 93. Roe, supra note 71, at 2065. 
 94. THOMAS DONALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 45–47 (1989); 
Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Toward a Unified Conception of Business Ethics: 
Integrative Social Contracts Theory, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 252 (1994). 
 95. Bainbridge, supra note 59, at 1435. 
 96. THOMAS M. JONES, ANDREW C. WICKS & R. EDWARD FREEMAN, Stakeholder 
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which individuals are entitled to status as a stakeholder.97 In 
addition, stakeholder theory is further criticized for failing to explain 
why the political process, rather than corporate law, is not the more 
appropriate venue for preventing firms from generating social costs 
or externalities.98 Enacting environmental, social, or criminal laws 
that deter corporate misconduct, critics contend, is the more 
“efficient” vehicle for curbing corporate misconduct.99 
C. Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft 
As we have seen, contractarianism may promote efficiency, 
reduce agency costs, and facilitate corporate decision-making, but 
can result in corporate generation of social costs or other 
externalities. Conversely, stakeholder theory promotes social welfare 
and elevates the interests of stakeholders vis-à-vis shareholders, but 
suffers from a well-defined framework to guide corporate decision-
making and may amplify problems of managerial sins. Parsing 
through the “good” and “bad” elements of contractarianism and 
stakeholder theory, the aim is now to develop a new model for 
corporate governance—in the context of community interests only—
that draws from the benefits of both theories while assuaging 
their shortcomings. 
1. Developing the Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach 
Using the benefits of both contractarianism and stakeholder 
theory, developing a model to govern corporate-community 
 
Theory: The State of the Art, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO BUSINESS ETHICS 25 
(Norman E. Bowie ed., 2002). 
 97. George W. Dent, Jr., Stakeholder Governance: A Bad Idea Getting Worse, 58 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 1107, 1107–08 (2008). See also generally Donaldson & Dunfee, supra note 
94, at 252; Dunham et al., supra note 21, at 3. 
 98. JOHN R. BOATRIGHT, Ethics and Corporate Governance: Justifying the Role of 
Shareholder, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO BUSINESS ETHICS, supra note 96, at 50, 55; Dent, 
supra note 97, at 1112–13 (“If . . . labor markets do not adequately protect, relief should 
come directly through changes in employment laws rather than through tinkering with 
corporate governance.”); Bainbridge, supra note 59, at 1431. See also Matthew T. Bodie, 
NASCAR Green: The Problem of Sustainability in Corporations and Corporate Law, 46 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 491, 520–21 (2011) (arguing that sustainability practices of a corporation are 
“peripheral” to corporate law). 
 99. Bainbridge, supra note 59, at 1431. See also Dent, supra note 97, at 1124 
(“Reliance on external forces (i.e., the law) to deter anti-social corporate behavior is likely to 
produce a better result than simply instructing directors to act in the public interest.”). 
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relations must begin by adopting the advantages either theory can 
offer if they further the interests of both shareholders and the 
community. For example, neither shareholders nor communities 
benefit when agency costs are high. If corporate managers are given 
too much latitude, that enables them to prioritize their own interests 
over the interests of either shareholders or the community, wealth 
transfers from shareholders and the community to corporate 
managers become plausible. For this reason, a corporation-
community governance model must seek to keep agency costs low. 
Second, shareholders and the community both benefit when the 
firm generates wealth without causing externalities or social costs. 
Shareholders benefit through dividends, and the community benefits 
through spillovers, like local employment or the firm’s use of local 
suppliers. Consequently, the model should seek to preserve the 
importance of wealth generation but balance it against the need to 
minimize the production of social costs. Nevertheless, because the 
model aims to minimize social costs, it may result in instances in 
which wealth generation will not be maximized. 
Finally, shareholders and the community may both benefit more 
when a firm ex ante prevents corporate misconduct. Ex ante 
approaches obviously prevent a community from having to suffer the 
consequences of corporate misconduct while in some cases, 
shareholders may benefit when the costs arising from correction—
such as reputational costs, costs arising from project delays and 
disruptions, and costs arising from successful lawsuits emanating out 
of the misconduct—are greater than the costs to prevent them.100 
Accordingly, a model governing corporate-community relations 
should seek to anticipate and proactively resolve potential sources of 
corporate abuse directed at the community. 
What this leaves us with is a corporate governance model that 
does not wholly abandon the wealth maximization norm espoused 
by contractarians, but seeks to reduce the social costs that 
corporations can generate that concern stakeholder theorists. In 
some ways, it adopts the model of corporate constituency statutes, 
which arguably permits corporate managers during a takeover “to 
select a plan that is second-best from the shareholders’ perspective,” 
 
 100. See Martin Petrin, Assessing Delaware’s Oversight Jurisprudence: A Policy and Theory 
Perspective, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 433, 463 (2011); HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, 
THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLES: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED; HOW TO FIX IT 92 (2006). 
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but which enhances the welfare of one or more of the firm’s 
stakeholders.101 However, the model goes further in that its 
applicability is not limited to instances of takeovers, and more 
importantly, it seeks to balance wealth maximization norms against 
community interest enhancement under a business-led approach that 
also prizes a community’s sustainability. 
The thrust of this model is that the relationship between a 
corporation and a community should be viewed symbiotically, 
enabling both the corporation and the community to benefit in a 
multitude of ways. Under this approach then, corporations should 
invest in their operating communities by leveraging activities integral 
to their business operations in an effort to achieve sustainable social 
gains and improve the business environment in which 
they operate.102 
More specifically, a Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach to 
corporate decision-making is based on corporate strategy, not 
philanthropy. Accordingly, corporate decision-making under this 
model is guided by two factors. First, corporations should primarily 
focus on investments in the community where they can extract 
benefits that improve their operating environment.103 In doing so, a 
corporation aligns economic and social goals, thereby improving 
both its long-term business prospects and the sustainability of the 
community investment. As the World Bank has found, linking 
investments in the community to business needs results in greater 
internal support and resources from management and shareholders, 
more efficient coordination with other business units enabling easier 
management of issues that can impact the company-community 
relationship, community investments with well-defined objectives 
and with a clear direction and purpose, and greater resilience of the 
 
 101. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. 
L. REV. 971, 994–95 (1992). Nevertheless, Bainbridge argues managers that select a second 
best plan for shareholders must demonstrate that their acts were “in the exercise of the utmost 
good faith.” Id. at 995–96. 
 102. Compare this model with leading models of strategic community investment. See, 
e.g., Shilpi Somaya, Non-Philanthropic Corporate Involvement in Community Development, 97 
BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 32 (1996); Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, The Competitive 
Advantage of Corporate Philanthropy, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2002, at 56; John A. Pearce II 
& Jonathan Doh, The High Impact of Collaborative Social Initiatives, 46 MIT SLOAN MGMT. 
REV. 29 (2005). 
 103. A business’ operating environment includes but is not limited to access to labor, 
capital, infrastructure, natural resources, land, related and supporting industries, and 
customers. 
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investment during budget cuts.104 Moreover, because the approach is 
business-led, or aligned with the corporation’s business performance 
and goals, there is less inclination for the corporation to simply 
provide handouts to the community, which is not sustainable in the 
long run.105 
A business-led approach to investing in a community, however, 
limits the breadth of a corporation’s community investment 
endeavors. While this may appear, at first glance, to be beneficial 
only to shareholder interests, it also ensures that corporations are less 
likely to engage in community investment in an overly paternalistic 
manner or in a manner that assumes too extensive of a state role. 
Unlike governments, corporations may simply be ill-equipped to 
engage in all types of community investment programs. Tying their 
community investments to their business interests ensures that they 
foster community interests that meet their capabilities.106 
Second, corporations should primarily engage in enhancing those 
community interests that leverage their core capabilities. While 
supporting worthwhile causes that have no relationship to the 
business is commendable, corporations that leverage their core 
capabilities engage in more efficient and better managed community 
investments.107 Contributing areas of strength in which companies 
have specialized expertise or a comparative advantage further ensures 
 
 104. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, STRATEGIC COMMUNITY INVESTMENT: 
A GOOD PRACTICE HANDBOOK FOR COMPANIES DOING BUSINESS IN EMERGING MARKETS 
13 (2010) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION]. 
 105. Id. at iv (providing free goods and services creates dependency and a sense of 
entitlement from which companies find it hard to extricate themselves during times of 
economic contraction or at project end). 
 106. See generally Thomas E. Cavanagh, Corporate Community Development: Meeting the 
Measurement Challenge, in THE CONFERENCE BOARD—RESEARCH REPORT R-1310-02-RR 
(2002); John Rolfe, Galina Ivanova & Stewart Lockie, Assessing the Social and Economic 
Impacts of Coal Mining on Communities in the Bowen Basin: Summary and Recommendation, 
in SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT TO REDUCE 
CONFLICT OVER MINE OPERATIONS RES. REP. NO. 11 (2006); Deanna Kemp, Richard Boele 
& David Brereton, Community Relations Management Systems in the Minerals Industry: 
Combining Conventional and Stakeholder-Driven Approaches, 9 INT’L. J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. 
390 (2006); David Humphreys, A Business Perspective on Community Relations in Mining, 26 
RESOURCES POL’Y. 127 (2000). 
 107. Porter & Kramer, supra note 102, at 59; INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, 
supra note 104, at 21; Pearce & Doh, supra note 102, at 34. A corporation’s core capabilities 
may encompass its areas of expertise, where it boasts a comparative advantage, or products or 
services that are based on expertise used in, or generated by, their normal operations. See 
Pearce & Doh, supra note 102, at 34. 
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that corporations have sufficient expertise to address the social 
problems raised by the community108 and can facilitate adoption of 
these types of programs into a corporation’s overall strategic 
planning.109 In effect, by harnessing the corporation’s “comparative 
advantage” over other actors, including in some cases governments, 
corporations can offer value to the community that extends beyond 
just money.110 For example, British Petroleum used its cost and 
technical advantages over local governments in providing solar-
powered refrigerators to store anti-malaria vaccines in Zambia.111 
Corporations that leverage their core capabilities can, in addition 
to maximizing gains to the community, minimize their own costs 
and diversions.112 Thus, J.P. Morgan, using its core competence of 
structuring and financing projects, managed low-interest loans for 
community projects using only a few new resources.113 Centering 
corporate-community interest alignment around core capabilities 
therefore furthers both economic and community goals. 
Finally, although a Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach is 
business-led, it also seeks to foster a community’s sustainable 
development,114 with the aim that the effects of the corporate activity 
are expected to survive beyond the corporation’s exit. Consequently, 
in order to offer meaningful gains to communities, corporations 
should strive to enhance those aspects of the community that will 
have a lasting impact. The goal here is to move away from the typical 
corporation-community model’s approach to fostering community 
interests as a mere public relations tool115 to one in which corporate 
and community interests are meaningfully improved. Thus, if 
corporations identify multiple areas in which their interests align with 
 
 108. As a community’s social problems have traditionally been administered by the state, 
in many cases, a corporation may simply not have sufficient expertise to properly address the 
issue. See generally Somaya, supra note 102; Cavanagh, supra note 106; Rolfe et al., supra note 
106; Kemp et al., supra note 106. 
 109. David Hess et al., The Next Wave of Corporate Community Initiatives: Corporate 
Social Initiatives, 44 CAL. MGMT. REV. 110, 112 (2002). 
 110. Id. at 113, 116 (“Social programs based on a firm’s core competencies means that it 
may be one of only a few firms (or perhaps the only firm) capable of providing such aid.”). 
 111. Id. at 116. 
 112. Pearce & Doh, supra note 102, at 34. 
 113. Cavanagh, supra note 106, at 37–44. 
 114. The United Nations defines sustainable development as being able to meet the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs: U.N. WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., supra note 66. 
 115. See, e.g., Kapelus, supra note 23, at 291. 
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community interests, they should prioritize those areas in which their 
actions will contribute to a community’s sustainable development. 
Corporations will, therefore, have to make tradeoffs between 
corporate and community interests on a continuum. That is, the 
more a decision enhances a corporation’s operating environment and 
the more it results in a sustainable community investment, which 
draws from the corporation’s core capabilities, the greater priority a 
corporation should accord to this activity. Table 1 depicts this 
continuum and offers a decision-matrix. 
 
Table 1- Decision Matrix—Continuum of Community and 
Corporate Interests116 
 
 
 
 
Enhancement of 
Corporation’s 
Operating Environment 
 
 
 
                        Sustainable Impact on Community 
Drawing from the decision matrix, we see that activities that land 
on the higher end of the continuum for improvements to both the 
corporation’s operating environment and the sustainable impact on 
community are accorded the highest priority. Medium priority is 
then accorded to activities that result in maximum improvements to 
either corporate or community interests while simultaneously 
resulting in low improvements to the contrary interest or where both 
interests are only somewhat improved. Finally, low to medium 
improvements to both corporate and community interests are 
accorded the lowest priority. 
The aim of this mode of decision-making is to move away from a 
notion where pursuing community interests is seen as a transfer of 
wealth from shareholders to the community and pursuing 
 
 116. This matrix draws in part from van Huijstee and Glasbergen’s issue matrix for topics 
of dialogue selection between corporations and stakeholders. See Mariëtte van Huijstee & 
Pieter Glasbergen, The Practice of Stakeholder Dialogue Between Multinationals and NGOs, 15 
CORP. SOC. RESP. ENV’T. MGMT. 298, 303 (2008). 
High 
Priority 
High 
Priority 
Medium 
Priority 
Medium 
Priority 
High 
Priority 
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Priority 
Medium 
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Low 
Priority 
Low 
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shareholder interests is viewed as a transfer of wealth from the 
community to shareholders. Instead, the goal of this decision-
making model is to proceed under the view that the risks inherent in 
corporate decision-making should be shared between shareholders 
and the community. 
Implicit in the decision-matrix is also the idea that corporate 
decisions that improve a corporation’s operating environment, but 
which result in a negative effect on the sustainable development of 
the community, should not be undertaken. As the premise of this 
model is a symbiotic view of corporations and communities, a 
corporate act that imposes high social costs on the community 
undercuts the base notion of the model. Corporate imposition of 
externalities onto the community is therefore antithetical to a 
Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach. While shareholders beholden to 
a strict notion of short-term wealth maximization may be reluctant 
to embrace this idea, the approach is premised on the idea that in the 
small number of cases of a true conflict between profits and a 
diminishment of a community’s sustainable development, the long-
term viability of the firm and the interests of the community demand 
that the generation of short-term profits should not be prioritized.117 
2. Contractarian or stakeholder? 
Neither wholly contractarian nor wholly an advocate of 
stakeholder theory, a Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach to decision-
making therefore hovers between the two dominant models. While it 
seeks to adopt some aspects of each model, it is reluctant to fully 
embrace either. 
In terms of the contractarian model, a Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft 
approach adopts, in part, and also departs from the notion of wealth 
maximization that underlies contractarianism. For contractarians, 
wealth maximization is the guiding norm of corporate decision-
making; if in so doing, the interests of non-shareholders are served, 
this is a by-product of the overarching norm.118 Accordingly, under a 
 
 117. For examples of where companies have foregone short-term profits to promote a 
community’s sustainable development and benefitted in the long-run from this decision, see 
the case studies in Part III(C)(1). 
 118. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 600 (2003) (“[I]f the board considers the interests of 
non-shareholder constituencies when making decisions, it does so only because shareholder 
wealth will be maximized in the long-run.”). See also Kaler, supra note 81, at 78. 
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strict contractarian approach, serving non-shareholder interests 
should be done to the minimum extent possible. In contrast, under 
the approach proposed here, serving community interests is not a by-
product, but an overarching complementary aim. While this means 
that corporate managers will still have to make trade-offs between 
wealth maximization and community interests, the trade-offs will not 
result in a zero sum game between the two interests. Instead, 
corporate managers will need to choose corporate actions that 
foster—but likely do not maximize—wealth generation as well as 
foster community interests. Still, since business considerations will 
dictate which of the numerous community interests the corporation 
should serve, the model should not increase agency costs. In 
addition, unlike contractarianism, in the case of a true conflict 
between economic and community interests, economic interests will 
not necessarily prevail as the model disavows corporate acts that 
impede a community’s sustainable development. 
The model also adopts, in part, and again departs from 
stakeholder theory. While it embraces the notion of serving the 
interests of more than just shareholders and seeks to minimize the 
harms that concern stakeholder theorists, it is reluctant to put 
shareholders on an equal footing with other stakeholders, in this case 
the community. This is because a business-led approach improves the 
relevance, sustainability, and effectiveness of the corporation’s ability 
to promote community interests.119 It also does not view trade-offs 
between economic and community interests as zero-sum games, but 
rather as integral to the long-run sustainability of both the 
corporation and the community. Indeed, the focus of this model is 
on the ways in which the community’s interests can be encompassed 
into the corporation’s interests. The ultimate goal is thus to view the 
community’s interest as the corporation’s (and, consequently, the 
shareholders’) interest. 
In effect, the Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft model is based on the 
notion that corporate investment in the community is desirable 
 
 119. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, supra note 104, at 13. See also Bryan 
W. Husted, Governance Choices for Corporate Social Responsibility: To Contribute, Collaborate 
or Internalise?, 36 LONG RANGE PLANNING 481, 491 (2003) (“CSR activities in areas closely 
related to the core business of the firm are usually internalized because of the greater 
competence of the firm and consequent increased ability to evaluate the decisions and activities 
of recipients.”); Somaya, supra note 102, at 32 (Strategic involvement is often more 
congruent, enduring, . . . and has greater long-term effects on the community). 
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because “the company is part of the community where the 
investment is being made. Returns on the investment are . . . seen as 
a public good that benefits the company by making its . . . 
community a more desirable place to live and work.”120 
III. ALIGNING CORPORATE-COMMUNITY INTERESTS THROUGH 
IDENTIFICATION 
As we have seen, a Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach seeks to 
foster benefits for both the corporation and the community by 
aligning corporate and community interests. However, the approach 
is only viable if the corporation can correctly identify the 
community’s interests. If it aligns its actions with interests that do 
not reflect the interest of the community, it has not furthered the 
community’s sustainable development. In that scenario, it may be 
better off simply pursuing a wealth maximization norm. Accurate 
community interest identification is, therefore, a critical first step to 
the success of a Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach. 
While a corporation is likely clear on its own interests, it may not 
have a thorough understanding of the community’s interests. As 
critics have observed, a business-led approach to strategic community 
investment can be “self-serving,” “corporate-centric,” and fail to 
include the participation or engagement of the community.121 
This type of approach, which often “assumes that the pursuit of 
competitive advantage automatically leads to better social 
development,” is premised on exploiting the community for the 
corporation’s benefit, and may effectively be a public relations 
program.122 Meaningful pursuit of the community’s interests is thus 
not necessarily served under a traditional business-led approach. 
One way for a corporation to meaningfully ascertain a 
community’s interests is to have the corporation “identify” with the 
operating community, through a process known as “social 
identification.” Social identity theorists argue that when an 
individual identifies with a group it facilitates goal integration and 
 
 120. Cavanagh, supra note 106, at 4. 
 121. Judy N. Muthuri, Participation and Accountability in Corporate Community 
Involvement Programmes: A Research Agenda, 43COMM. DEV. J. 177, 184 (2008); Diana 
Klein & Ulrike Joras, Natural Resources and Peacebuilding: The Role of the Private Sector, 42 
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10511, 10515 (2012). 
 122. Muthuri, supra note 121, at 184; Kapelus, supra note 23, at 291. 
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congruence between the individual and a group.123 Although they 
acknowledge that individual identification with a group may be only 
partial or a matter of degree,124 they contend that it is the process of 
social identification that gives rise to the individual’s perception of 
“oneness” with the group. In turn, this enables the individual to 
conceptualize or commit to the culture, values, or norms of 
the group. 
Drawing from social identity theory, we can thus see that if a 
corporation identifies, even partially, with the operating community, 
it is better placed to comprehend, support, and adhere to the norms, 
values, and culture of the community. Aligning corporate and 
community interests then becomes less of a matter of assuming 
improvements to the community through pursuit of a competitive 
advantage strategy and more of an effort to further the interests of 
the community because the corporation views itself as intertwined 
with the fate of the community. 
In the next section, we examine case studies in which 
corporations have attempted to “identify” with their operating 
communities and assess the benefits and disadvantages stemming 
from this approach. However, before proceeding to the case studies, 
the following section provides a brief background on the mechanics 
of social identity theory. 
A. An Overview of Social Identity Theory 
Social identity theory is a social-psychological perspective on how 
individuals identify with particular groups. According to social 
identity theory, people tend to classify themselves and others into 
various social categories as a means of ordering their social 
environment and in order to locate or define themselves in the social 
environment.125 Social identification is the means by which an 
individual can partially answer the question: Who am I?126 
 
 123. Blake E. Ashforth & Fred Mael, Social Identity Theory and the Organization, 14 
ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 20, 26 (1989) (arguing that goal commitment and internalization is a 
consequence of social identification). See also Douglas T. Hall et al., Personal Factors in 
Organizational Identification, 15 ADMIN. SCIENCE Q. 176, 176–77 (1970). 
 124. Ashforth & Mael, supra note 123, at 21. 
 125. See generally Henri Tajfel & John C. Turner, The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup 
Behavior, in PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 7 (William G. Austin & Stephen 
Worchel, eds., 2d ed., 1985). 
 126. See generally, Sheldon Stryker & Richard T. Serpe, Commitment, Identity Salience, 
DO NOT DELETE 7/14/2014  3:47 PM 
257 Aligning Corporate and Community Interests 
 287 
Identification can occur despite any effort by the individual to 
further the group’s goals. Indeed identification begins once the 
individual perceives himself as being “psychologically intertwined 
with the fate of the group.”127 For this reason, when an individual 
has identified with a group, he will vicariously partake in the 
successes and status of the group.128 
Social identification, however, is a matter of degree. As most 
individuals can categorize themselves into multiple groups (e.g., 
American, father, attorney. . .), the extent of identification with each 
group will vary and may be dependent on the extent to which the 
individual values the group’s persona.129 Nevertheless, regardless of 
the degree of identification, identification with a group will enhance 
an individual’s support and commitment to the group. Identification 
also fosters a positive view of the group and may “engender 
internationalization of, and adherence to, group values 
and norms.”130 
The process of social identification occurs primarily through 
interactions. Interactions between the individual and group can be 
verbal or non-verbal (e.g. through symbols or images), may involve 
interpreting the responses of others in certain social interactions, or 
can result from immersing the individual in the social milieu of the 
group.131 Identification may also arise through reification.132 That is, 
regard for individuals in the group may be generalized to the group 
 
and Role Behavior: Theory And Research Example, in PERSONALITY, ROLES, AND SOCIAL 
BEHAVIOR 199 (William J. Ickes & Eric S. Knowles eds., 1982); John C. Turner, Towards A 
Cognitive Redefinition of The Social Group, in SOCIAL IDENTITY AND INTERGROUP 
RELATIONS 15 (Henri Tajfel ed., 2010).  
 127. Ashforth & Mael, supra note 123, at 21. 
 128. Id. at 22. 
 129. Id. at 21. 
 130. Id. at 26. 
 131. Id. at 27. See alsoJohn Van Maanen, The Self, the Situation, and the Rules of 
Interpersonal Relations,in ESSAYS IN INTERPERSONAL DYNAMICS 43 (W. Bennis et al. eds., 
1979); Howard S. Becker & James W. Carper, The Development of Identification with an 
Occupation, 61 AM. J. OF SOC. 289 (1956). 
 132. Ashforth & Mael, supra note 123, at 28. See also John C. Turner, Social 
identification and Psychological Group Formation, in THE SOCIAL DIMENSION: EUROPEAN 
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2, 518 (Henri Tajfel et al. eds., 1984). 
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itself.133 In addition, socialization and social cues develop an 
individual’s identities or reinforce them.134 
B. Framework for Applying Social Identity Theory to Corporations 
Social identity theory suggests a unique approach to aligning 
corporate and community interests. Encouraging a corporation to 
identify with its community, even if only partially, facilitates the 
corporation’s support and commitment to the community’s 
interests, and is more likely to foster an interest in adhering to the 
community’s values and norms. 
Still, there may be reason to be skeptical about the applicability 
of a social psychological theory focusing on individual behavior to 
corporations. Because social identity theory focuses on defining an 
individual’s perception of himself or herself within a group, it may be 
difficult to comprehend how it could be equally applicable to 
corporations, which are nothing more than legal entities, and which 
lack the human ability of self-perception. 
However, behind the legal artifice, corporations are simply 
composites of individuals. It is individuals who work for, organize, 
operate, and manage the corporation. It is also these same 
individuals who possess the ability to define themselves in a group 
setting, thereby enabling the application of social identity theory. 
Moreover, it is these individuals, acting behind the legal artifice 
of the corporation, who have now begun to spend considerable 
effort in creating separate identities for corporations.135 For instance, 
well-known corporate identities include Johnson & Johnson, which 
is known as “the caring company,” and Apple Inc., which is known 
as the innovative company. Indeed, defining a corporate identity is 
akin to the practice of defining oneself under social identity theory. 
Whereas under social identity theory, an individual will answer the 
question “Who am I?”, in defining a corporate identity, the 
 
 133. Ashforth & Mael, supra note 123, at 28. See also generally BERNARD M. BAS, 
LEADERSHIP AND PERFORMANCE BEYOND EXPECTATIONS (1985).  
 134. Kay Deaux, Social Identity, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WOMEN AND GENDER, VOLUMES 
ONE AND TWO 7, 9 (Judith Worell ed., 2001). 
 135. See generally Stuart Albert & David. A. Whetten, Organizational Identity,in 
RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOUR (L. L. Cummings & Barry M. Staw eds., 1985); 
T.C. Melewar & Elizabeth Jenkins, Defining the Corporate Identity Construct, 5 CORP. 
REPUTATION REV. 76 (2002). 
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organization will answer the question, “Who are we (as an 
organization)?”136 
Nevertheless, while the identity of the individual defining himself 
or herself in a social situation is clear, it is less clear who is 
responsible for defining an identity in the corporate context. 
Similarly, in applying social identity theory to corporations in the 
community context, it is unclear who the actors are behind the 
corporation’s identification with the community. Identification by a 
corporate actor with the community can theoretically occur at any 
organization level. An employee is as likely to be drawn to a 
community’s interests as a manager or director would be. Yet, not all 
of the corporate actors are equally placed to understand the interests 
of the corporation such that any proposed alignment of corporate 
and community interests will be meaningful. 
For this reason, corporate identification with the interests of the 
community must resonate at the board level. As the ultimate 
decision-makers of the firm, the board enjoys wide discretion to take 
into account and make trade-offs between different corporate 
constituents.137 Accordingly, a board that has identified with its 
operating community is better placed to understand the trade-offs 
between shareholder and community interests that are needed to 
foster alignment of corporate and community interests. Thus, 
identification works best when the board itself interacts with the 
community or delegates the interactions to a manager or employee. 
In other words, while identification can move up the organizational 
hierarchy from an employee to board level or down from the board 
to employees,138 board ownership of identification with the 
community remains imperative. 
 
 136. Albert & Whetten, supra note 135, at 263. 
 137. Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: 
THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 56 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985) 
(noting “the board of directors is the ultimate decision-making body of the corporation (and 
in a sense is the group most appropriately identified with ‘the corporation’)”); Blair & Stout, 
supra note 26, at 291 (arguing “directors [have] tremendous discretion to sacrifice 
shareholders’ interests in favor of . . . deciding what is best for ‘the firm’”). 
 138. Interactions with the community that begin below board level must eventually be 
transmitted to the board and the board must “buy-in” to the importance of these interactions 
with the community before identification with the community can occur. 
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C. Examples of Corporate Identification 
Despite the benefits of corporate identification with their 
operating communities, requiring interactions between corporations 
and communities has not traditionally been an important aspect of 
the corporate-community relationship. As the president of a 
community association observed in connection with the arrival of a 
multinational company into his community: the company acts 
“without consulting us, acting as if everything belongs to them . . . .”139 
Even those scholars who advocate corporate consideration of 
community interests fail to acknowledge the need for corporations to 
interact with their operating communities.140 Instead, these scholars 
acknowledge corporate hegemony and the “unbalanced” corporate-
community relationships that derive from that attribute, but assume 
that unilateral corporate decisions to invest in the community will 
automatically benefit the community.141 
The failure of corporations to interact with their operating 
communities is somewhat surprising as there is considerable support 
for the notion that dialogue between parties is essential to problem 
solving. For example, a proactive dialogue in which dilemmas are 
openly shared has been found “to stimulate a mutual learning 
process that spurs creativity and innovation,”142 to be important for 
detecting and deriving solutions to complex business-related 
sustainability problems, and to be essential to managing risk related 
to stakeholders and integral for gaining a competitive advantage on 
stakeholder-related issues.143 
Perhaps with the benefits of dialogue in mind, a small but 
increasing group of corporations are seeking to identify, through 
interactions, with their operating communities. In some instances 
these are corporations that previously had combative relationships 
with their community. As one corporation admits, its past  
 
 
 139. Paulo Flávio Machado, President of the Barra do Riacho Community Association as 
cited in ARACRUZ CELULOSE—2008 ANNUAL AND SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 34 (2008), 
available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/system/attachments/514/original/ 
COP.pdf?1262614196. 
 140. See, e.g., Muthuri’s criticisms of the dominant community investment models. 
Muthuri, supra note 121, at 184. 
 141. Id. 
 142. van Huijstee & Glasbergen, supra note 116, at 300. 
 143. Id. 
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community relationships were ones in which “polarization and 
paternalization prevailed.”144 Yet the modern approach of these 
corporations is to emphasize engagement with the community. 
Three case studies of corporations that have chosen to identify with 
their operating communities follow. These include Fibria Celulose in 
various communities in Brazil, Royal Dutch and Shell in 
communities in southern Philippines, and Cascade Engineering in 
Grand Rapids, Michigan. 
1. Case studies 
Fibria Celulose, a pulp and paper company headquartered in 
Brazil, is an example of a corporation that has decided to revise its 
approach to community interests after years of acrimonious 
relationships with its operating communities. Its new approach is an 
engagement model designed to optimize corporate-community 
engagement.145 The model is tripartite in nature and encompasses 
dialogue, a participative agenda, and engagement. 
In dialogue, the corporation engages in discussions with affected 
communities to ascertain its impacts on the communities and to take 
action for any negative impacts. The “participative agenda” 
component then requires a company representative, chosen through 
the regional office, to become acquainted with the people of the 
community and become “a constant presence in the community.” 
The aim is to have a “physical presence” in the community that will 
facilitate the company’s access to the people of the community and 
vice-versa. Finally, the model involves engagement in which 
corporate discussions with stakeholders bring to light issues of 
mutual interest. Engagement is designed to deepen the corporation’s 
relationship with the community and establish it as a partner in 
local development. 
Fibria cites its engagement model as a method by which it 
garners a better understanding of the community’s critical issues and 
by which it can then take into consideration the community’s issues 
in its decision-making process.146 Some community members seem 
 
 144. FIBRIA CELULOSE S.A., SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2010, at 66 (2010), available at 
http://www.fibria.com.br/rs2010/en/. 
 145. FIBRIA, INVESTOR RELATIONS, STRATEGY AND COMPETITIVE STRENGTHS (Mar. 9, 
2012), available at http://fibria.infoinvest.com.br/static/enu/estrategia-vantagens-
competitivas.asp?idioma=enu. 
 146. Id. 
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to agree. As one community member notes, “the company is getting 
to know our culture better,”147 while another comments that “our 
lives. . . have changed a lot [for the better] since Fibria came here 
and settled in our midst.”148 Moreover, although community 
members note that problems between the corporation and the 
community persist, they praise the company for being “really . . . 
open to listening. [T]hey take the situation, discuss it there, then 
come back with a response; we are not left without a response 
. . . .”149 Similar to Fibria, Shell has adopted a greater interest in 
community matters as a result of its poor previous community 
relationships, such as its previously discussed experience in the Niger 
Delta. The Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project150 in the 
Philippines was Shell’s first project under its new approach. Shell’s 
aim was to obtain the community’s ex ante consent to its operations. 
Two years before project construction began, Shell began the 
process to obtain community consent using four strategies. These 
included community outreach and interviews with key opinion 
leaders and decision makers; information dissemination, education, 
and communication activities; perception surveys and participatory 
workshops to introduce the project and validate initial survey results; 
and participatory involvement in the formulation of environmental 
management plans.151 It also held town hall meetings to hear and 
respond to community concerns and public hearings to review the 
results of an environmental impact report of the project.152 
Through its interactions with the affected communities, Shell 
became aware of the community’s needs and found venues through 
which they could allay the community’s concerns about the 
environmental impacts of the project. More importantly, once Shell 
became aware of the community’s needs, it could directly align its 
 
 147. ARACRUZ CELULOSE, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2008, at 33 (2008), available at 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/system/attachments/514/original/COP.pdf?126261419
6. (Aracruz was the predecessor company to Fibria). 
 148. FIBRIA, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2011, at 92 (2011), available at 
http://www.fibria.com.br/rs2011/en/. 
 149. Id. at 94. 
 150. The Malampaya project involves the extraction of natural gas from below the seabed 
and the transportation of the gas by undersea pipeline to a natural gas refinery plant more than 
five hundred kilometers from the extraction site. 
 151. STEVEN HERZ ET AL., DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT CONFLICT: THE BUSINESS CASE 
FOR COMMUNITY CONSENT 21 (2007). 
 152. Id. at 21 
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interests with pertinent community interests. For example, the 
community expressed an interest in working for the project, but 
most members of the community did not have the necessary skills.153 
Shell, therefore, trained the local residents in skills such as welding 
and masonry, and then employed them. 
Moreover, once the construction of the project was complete 
and Shell no longer needed the workers they had trained, they 
retrained the workers in skills such as electronics and animation, and 
helped them find employment with other neighboring businesses.154 
Shell also rerouted a pipeline, at three times the initial cost, when it 
learned, through meetings with community leaders, that the original 
route for the pipeline would impact areas of rich biodiversity or cross 
the ancestral waters of one of the indigenous communities.155 
Finally, Shell maintains ongoing community relations by having its 
representatives meet monthly with community leaders to provide 
updates on project operations and to enable the community to 
raise concerns.156 
Corporate identification with the community is not, however, 
confined to corporations operating globally. Cascade Engineering, a 
plastic injection moldings business based in Grand Rapids, Michigan, 
has been identifying with its community for a number of years. 
Possessing comparative advantages in manufacturing and inventory 
management, Cascade also offers a particular expertise in employee 
training.157 Due to the high level of skill necessary to produce its 
product, Cascade has developed a “human capital” program that 
offers cutting edge skills training.158 The program is considered one 
of the most comprehensive training programs in the United 
States.159 
Due to its experience in human capital development, in the late 
1990s, Cascade was approached by local county officials to 
participate in a newly formed welfare-to-work program. The 
program was designed to move welfare recipients into paid 
employment as quickly as possible. Cascade managers were drawn to 
 
 153. Id. at 23. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 24. 
 156. Id. at 25. 
 157. Cavanagh, supra note 106, at 29–30. 
 158. Id. at 30. 
 159. Id. 
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the program as its aims aligned with the general philosophy of 
Cascade, which was “to improve and strengthen the community in 
which you live.”160 At the same time, Cascade identified a business 
advantage to participating in the program. Since recruitment and 
retention efforts from the local labor pool in Grand Rapids were 
intensely competitive, the program gave them access to an untapped 
pool of labor.161 
After three iterations, the program that Cascade ultimately 
developed to recruit and retain welfare workers was based on its pre-
existing training program, but was modified based on research on 
generational poverty.162 Working with an expert manual, Cascade 
introduced programs to combat typical problems of generational 
poverty employees.163 For instance, it identified and worked to 
remove barriers to sustained employment, such as lack of childcare 
and reliable transportation, and provided an orientation program 
that introduced employees to the culture and norms of working 
life.164 Cascade considers the program a success as it is able to retain 
on average 97.4% of the ninety candidates it recruits each year.165 A 
past CEO of Cascade attributes the success of the program to 
working with the community. “You can’t work on one part of that 
system, or it’s just like squeezing a balloon”, he explains. “You 
have . . . to look at the whole system and understand it . . . .”166 
2. Assessment 
The Fibria, Shell, and Cascade Engineering case studies highlight 
both the mechanisms by which corporations can identify with 
communities as well as the mutual corporate-community benefits 
that identification can garner. In terms of identification, all three of 
the corporations relied on two methods: immersion and formalized 
 
 160. Id. at 36. As a company representative observes, involving Cascade in the 
community will “make Cascade a better company, . . . make society a better place to live in 
[and ] . . . help our economy”. Id. 
 161. Id. at 30. 
 162. Id. at 31; Jennifer Hu et al., Cascade Engineering: Building Frontline Employee 
Programs For Triple Bottom Line Impact, ASPEN INSTITUTE CASE STUDY – LWW-02, at 5–6 
(2012). 
 163. Cavanagh, supra note 106, at 31. 
 164. Hu et al., supra note 162, at 6–7. 
 165. Id. at 8. 
 166. Cavanagh, supra note 106, at 36. 
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interaction. Each of the companies, for instance, immersed 
themselves in their community by locating their company or a 
representative of the company in the operating community. As social 
identity theorists have observed, identification will be facilitated 
through immersion in a group. 
Fibria cites locating a member of its company in the community 
as a way for the community to have access to the company, but the 
reverse may be equally true. For example, Fibria has been better able 
to understand the community’s culture by locating itself within it. 
Similarly, one of Cascade’s aims in becoming involved with the 
welfare-to-work community was to make the community where both 
its company and the workers were located “a better place to live in.” 
167 The corporation’s physical proximity to the community was a 
basis, thus, for comprehension of the needs of the community and as 
a means of increasing its sense of solidarity with the community. 
Each of the companies also interacted with the community in a 
number of ways. Cascade, for instance, which was not well versed in 
the meaning and symbols of the welfare community relied on expert 
advice to become familiar with its inner workings and then interacted 
with the welfare workers using their own terminology and language. 
Conversely, Fibria and Shell initiated a dialogue process with their 
communities. Fibria, for instance, organized both dialogue processes 
to garner feedback on their projects and engagement processes that 
involve discussions to create sustainable corporate-community 
projects. Shell, on the other hand, organized town hall meetings and 
public hearings in order to enable a broad range of community 
members, and not just elites, to voice their opinion on its project. 
Indeed, while dialogue processes with communities have often been 
prone to manipulation—for example where a corporation “educates” 
a community about its project as a public relations exercise—these 
companies made concerted efforts to engage in a bidirectional 
communication process with the community, which sought to utilize 
or act upon their views.168 
Each of the case studies also exemplifies the mutual benefits, to 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. See generally Jane Fiona Cumming, Engaging Stakeholders in Corporate 
Accountability Programmes: A Cross-Sectoral Analysis of UK And Transnational Experience, 
10:1 BUS. ETHICS: EUR. REV. 45 (2001); Abigail Oxley Green & Lynsey Hunton-Clarke, A 
Typology of Stakeholder Participation For Company Environmental Decision-Making, 12:5 BUS. 
STRATEGY & ENV’T. 292 (2003). 
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both the community and to the corporation, to which corporate 
identification with the community can give rise. Fibria, for instance, 
has fostered community interests by supporting over seventy 
community projects, including using unused portions of the 
company’s eucalyptus plantations to run small-scale forestry and 
agribusiness projects, running environmental and conservation 
education programs in schools, and providing employment skills 
workshops.169 Fostering community interests has also given Fibria a 
social license to operate, which reduces the costs of community 
opposition to its projects and may enhance its reputation. 
Similarly, Cascade’s program benefits the community by offering 
meaningful employment to indigent members as well as giving the 
company access to a new pool of local labor in a competitive 
employment market.170 In addition, Cascade estimates that its 
program has resulted in a five-year cumulative net marginal benefit 
of $502,000 and that the community has benefitted at a rate of just 
under $900,000 per year, in part from not having to provide 
government assistance to each of the recipients of the program.171 
Yet, it is Shell’s Malampaya project that best details the extent of 
benefits corporate identification with the community can offer. Shell 
made initial investments in the community of $6 million, and it 
maintains community interests through annual investments of 
approximately $500,000.172 More importantly, since the community 
collaborated on the projects chosen for the investments, the 
investments have had both a meaningful impact on the community, 
and are sustainable, in that their benefits remain even after Shell’s 
exit.173 For instance, the benefits of rerouting a pipeline to protect  
 
 169. FIBRIA SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2010: RELATIONSHIP WITH COMMUNITIES 
(2010), http://www.fibria.com.br/rs2010/en/template?go=social/social_comunidades_ 
relacionamento.html. 
 170. As Cascade notes, these are not dead-end burger flipping jobs. The program’s 
starting salary is $10/hour, but it offers promotions to these employees as well, meaning that 
for some, they will go from welfare to salaries of over $30,000 in two years. Cavanagh, supra 
note 106, at 35. 
 171. James R. Bradley, Bridging the Cultures of Business & Poverty: Welfare to Career at 
Cascade Engineering, Inc., STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. 80 (Spring 2003), available at 
http://www.ssireview.org/articles/entry/bridging_the_cultures_of_business_and_poverty. 
 172. HERZ, supra note 151, at 25. 
 173. The United Nations Environment Program recognized the importance of the 
community investments made by Shell by awarding it the World Business Summit Award for 
Sustainable Development Partnerships in 2002. See Alejandro R. Roces, Malampaya Gas 
Project Wins Int’l Award, PHILIPPINE STAR (Sept. 7, 2002). 
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the community’s biodiversity or provision of transferable 
employment skills to local residents are not dependent on 
Shell’s presence. 
However, in addition to fostering community interests, Shell has 
been able to further its own economic interests. Shell estimates that 
it avoided $50 to $72 million in costs through ex ante community 
consent.174 In particular, obtaining community approval for the 
project enabled Shell to avoid construction delays arising from 
community opposition to the project and penalty fees that it would 
have had to pay to the power plant operators if the gas was not 
delivered by the scheduled date.175 Community consent also enabled 
Shell to complete the construction of the project ahead 
of schedule.176 
Still, the approaches employed by the corporations are not 
without their flaws. Fibria, for example, may not be consistently 
employing its engagement model with each of the communities in 
which it operates. Thus, in 2010 local non-government 
organizations accused Fibria of compromising the way of life of the 
Quilombola community through the establishment of eucalyptus 
plantations on their lands.177 Moreover, Fibria still faces problems 
with several communities because of the lack of engagement its 
predecessor corporation, Aracruz, took in conducting relations with 
local communities.178 
Nevertheless despite their shortcomings, the case studies 
demonstrate that corporate identification with the community 
presents a number of distinct advantages. For the corporation it can 
offer legal and social risk minimization,179 cost avoidance, new 
 
 174. HERZ, supra note 151, at 25. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. World Wildlife Federation, Reconciling the Needs of Local People and the Pulp 
Industry: A Case Study From Espírito Santo, Brazil, PANDA.ORG (Mar. 30, 2012), 
http://awsassets.panda.org/downloads/brazilpulppapercasestudy_pdf.pdf. 
 178. Id.; World Rainforest Movement, Brazil: Aracruz Sows Violence and Destruction in 
Espirito Santo, WRM’S BULLETIN NO. 161 (Dec. 2010). 
 179. Community opposition to corporate activities can manifest itself through lawsuits 
aimed at the corporation or physical attacks on the corporation’s infrastructure, operations, or 
employees. See Amy K. Lehr & Gare A. Smith, Implementing a Corporate Free, Prior, and 
Informed Consent Policy: Benefits and Challenges, FOLEY HOAG 21 (2010) (arguing that 
companies’ failure to garner community consent to their operations “can lead to social 
unrest . . . decades of conflict and reputation-damaging lawsuits”). 
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sources of labor, access to new markets, greater definition to its legal 
operating environment,180 and enhancements to its reputation. It 
also avoids developing a paternalistic relationship between the 
corporation and the community. 
At the same time, it can offer the community sustainable 
development, with benefits that continue beyond the exit of the 
corporation, and protection of its idiosyncratic interests, such as its 
culture or heritage. Moreover, because identification requires 
meaningful interactions with the community, this process is less 
likely to give rise to a “disingenuous public relations exercise.”181 
Instead, through meaningful interactions with the community, the 
case studies demonstrate that substantive changes can be made to 
corporate behavior that accommodate or foster the needs of 
the community. 
Nonetheless, the case studies also evidence that corporate 
identification with the community does not necessarily optimize a 
corporation’s wealth nor satisfy all of the community’s interests. Still, 
it does avoid decision-making being transformed into a zero-sum 
game. Even better, it produces a less conflicted and more 
harmonious relationship between the corporation and the 
community, ultimately leading to mutual gains. 
IV. REGULATING THE ALIGNMENT OF CORPORATE AND 
COMMUNITY INTERESTS 
As we have seen, a Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach to 
corporate decision-making, by way of corporate identification with 
the community, can lead to mutual benefits for the corporation and 
the community. Yet as this approach remains the exception and not 
the norm for corporate consideration of community interests, ways 
by which corporations can be encouraged to take this approach are 
considered next. Three methods for encouraging corporate and 
community interest alignment are discussed: public regulation, self-
regulation, and a hybrid system. 
 
 180. Id. 
 181. This has been a critique of several corporate social responsibility programs. See, e.g., 
John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory Versus Practice 
in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1, 16 (2005). 
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A. Public Regulation 
One method by which corporations will align their interests with 
those of the community is to impose this duty upon them through 
enactment of public regulations. For instance, the Philippine 
government conditions the granting of environmental licenses to 
corporations on the completion of a matrix on community consent. 
This requires a corporation to evidence that it has successfully 
addressed six areas,182 ranging from the environmental soundness of 
the project to engagement of the public participation process to 
promotion of social and intergenerational equity. Specific evidence 
the regulation demands includes information about the manner in 
which the corporation has consulted with the community and 
incorporated their suggestions and/or information pertaining to the 
involvement of women or other vulnerable groups into livelihood 
programs/projects run in connection with the project.183 
Similarly, the Canadian government requires corporations to 
consult with certain indigenous communities prior to the 
commencement of major development projects.184 More specifically, 
the Canadian government mandates that corporations negotiate an 
“Impact and Benefit Agreement” with the affected communities, 
which provides for mitigation of the adverse impacts of the project 
and provides benefits to the affected communities.185 Specific areas 
the government suggests should be included as topics of negotiation 
include training and preferential hiring for members of the affected 
community, protection and conservation of archaeological sites and 
specimens, and establishment of a liaison between the community  
 
 
 
 182. These include: ecological and environmental soundness of the proposed project, 
effective implementation of the public participation process, resolution of conflicts, promotion 
of social and intergenerational equity and poverty alleviation, and proposed mitigation 
measures for adverse impacts and measures for the enhancement of positive impacts on people. 
HERZ, supra note 151, at 21–22. 
 183. Id. See also PHILIPPINES DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL 
RESOURCES, Admin. Order No. 96-37 ORDER TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE 
IMPLEMENTATION THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (EIS) SYSTEM (Dec. 2, 1996) 
(Phil.). 
 184. See, e.g., Nanavut Land Claims Agreement Act, R.S.C. 1993, c. 29, art. 26 (Can.). 
 185. Id. 
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and the corporation to facilitate incorporation of the community’s 
participation and concerns.186 
Public regulation is primarily designed to exact benefits under a 
notion of command and control. The government commands 
corporations to consider community interests and controls their 
behavior through the threat of negative sanctions.187 Corporations 
are thus legally obligated to follow the minimum standards for 
community interest consideration or face sanctions. Both the 
regulations used by the Philippine and Canadian governments 
exemplify this approach as licenses or permits to operate are denied if 
corporations do not meet the specified standards. Public regulation 
also enables governments to impose minimum standards for 
community interest protection and may enable it to induce greater 
degrees of compliance with these standards if the penalties for non-
compliance are onerous.188 Vigilant enforcement of the regulation 
further provides consistent levels of corporate compliance over a 
period of time.189 
However, public regulation does not necessarily coincide with a 
Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach to corporate decision-making. As 
public regulations generally employ a top-down approach, they often 
fail to take into account the individual circumstances of either the 
corporation or the community.190 Having to adhere to these rules 
can therefore disincentivize corporations from developing individual 
or unique approaches to considering community interests.191 It can 
also hamper the ability of a corporation to tie its business acumen to 
community interests, which as we have seen is one of the strengths of 
a Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach as it avoids corporate 
paternalistic behavior and increases corporate-community 
sustainable relationships.192 
 
 186. Id. at 210, Schedule 26-1. 
 187. Darren Sinclair, Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control? Beyond False 
Dichotomies, 19 L. & POL’Y 529, 534 (1997). 
 188. Anita I. Anand, Voluntary vs Mandatory Corporate Governance: Towards An 
Optimal Regulatory Framework 9 (Am. Law and Econ. Assoc. Annual Meetings, Working 
Paper, No. 44, 2005). 
 189. Sinclair, supra note 187, at 534. 
 190. See, e.g., Anand, supra note 188, at 16–17; Jennifer Nash, & John Ehrenfeld, Code 
Green: Business Adopts Voluntary Environmental Standards, 38 ENV’T.: SCI. & POL’Y FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEV., Jan.–Feb. 1996, at 16, 17. 
 191. Anand, supra note 188, at 16; Nash & Ehrenfeld, supra note 190, at 17. 
 192. See supra notes 105–107. 
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Public regulations may further impose greater costs on both the 
government and corporations. For governments, costs arise from 
drafting, implementing, monitoring and enforcing the regulation. In 
a time of austerity, these types of costs may be simply prohibitive for 
some governments.193 For corporations, public regulations impose 
internal management costs, or the costs of organizing itself to 
comply with a legal rule.194 Thus, under the regulations imposed by 
the Philippine government, corporations must first internally 
organize themselves in a prescribed manner such that they can report 
on the six designated areas in addition to expending the costs of 
satisfying community interests. 
Public regulations may also suffer from lack of government 
expertise or disinterest in promoting community interests. 
Implementing quality corporate-community interest regulations may 
not be within the expertise of some governments, while other 
governments may be disinclined from implementing any regulations 
at all. In particular, governments of some developing countries have 
been known to be more interested in attracting the capital infusion 
of foreign corporations rather than protecting community interests 
and may view regulations that mandate community interest 
consideration as antithetical to their main goal.195 In fact, there are 
even some governments which make it impossible or illegal to carry 
out any engagement processes with affected communities.196 
In short, public regulations mandating corporations to consider 
community interests may not further the interests of either the 
community or the corporation. While use of public regulations can 
allow governments to impose minimum standards of community 
 
 193. In fact even the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has been faced with a 
decreasing budget and an increasing load of mandated responsibilities. In 1996, a former 
administrator of the EPA observed that the EPA was not able to meet more than 80 percent of 
the environmental standards set by Congress. See Nash & Ehrenfeld, supra note 190, at 17. 
 194. Anand, supra note 188, at 13. 
 195. See, for example, the experience of Manhattan Mining, a U.S. corporation that was 
granted a concession contract by the Federal Government of Peru but which failed to dialogue 
with the local community. The community was ultimately able to cease the corporation’s 
activities in Peru. See Peru |Tambogrande: Manhattan Minerals, supra note 31. Similarly, in 
Metalclad, the Federal Government of Mexico granted a license to a U.S. corporation to 
operate a hazardous waste facility in a community without the community’s input. The 
community opposed the facility and passed an ordinance that ultimately left the corporation 
unable to use the site. See Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (Aug. 
30, 2000) 5 ICSID 212 (2002). 
 196. Lehr & Smith, supra note 179, at 41. 
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interest protection and, if effectively monitored and enforced, 
increase corporate compliance with these standards, it also imposes 
considerable costs on both the government and corporations. 
Moreover, it may impede the development of individually tailored 
corporate solutions to the problems and may interfere with corporate 
ability to link competitive advantages to community interests. Most 
importantly, as many governments fail to prioritize the interests of 
the community, public regulations protecting these interests may be 
deficient in scope or size or simply not be present at all. 
B. Self-Regulation 
A second approach to facilitating a Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft 
approach to corporate decision-making is to have corporations, 
independent of government involvement, undertake to develop their 
own rules and enforcement mechanisms for considering community 
interests. As the case studies have indicated, there are a few 
corporations already employing this method. Some companies and 
industries are also seeking to develop their own principles for 
engaging with the community.197 For instance, Talisman Energy 
Inc., an oil and gas company, recently commissioned a report on 
developing practices for community engagement for its projects.198 
There are a number of advantages to self-regulation. For one, self-
regulation enables corporations to tailor individualized approaches to 
problems, such as using business strengths as a means of fostering 
community interests. Self-regulation further enables corporations to act 
on their own initiative rather than be coerced into a particular course of 
action, and there is a natural tendency to prefer this course of action 
over the command and control approach of public regulation.199 This 
approach may also result in greater commitment to community interest 
protection as self-regulation requires changes from within the 
corporation such as management commitment, genuine recognition of 
the need to protect community interests, and changes to 
corporate policy.200 
 
 197. Thus, the Forest Stewardship Council now advises companies to obtain community 
consent for forest operations. See FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, supra note 46. 
 198. See Lehr & Smith, supra note 179. 
 199. Sinclair, supra note 187, at 534. 
 200. Alex Wawryk, Regulating Transnational Corporations Through Corporate Codes of 
Conduct, in TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 53, 61 (Jedrzej George 
Frynas & Scott Pegg eds., 2003); Nash & Ehrenfeld, supra note 190, at 17. 
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Compared to public regulation, self-regulation is also a less 
expensive option for both governments and corporations. 
Governments need not incur the costs of drafting, implementing, or 
enforcing the regulations and corporations do not incur added 
internal management costs. Self-regulation also enables corporations 
to align community interests with existing business strengths 
meaning that these investments will be achieved at low incremental 
costs. In addition, in countries where law enforcement or monitoring 
is weak, self-regulation may be more effective than 
public regulations.201 
At the same time, corporate self-regulation is meaningless if the 
approach adopted does not adequately address at least some 
substantive community interest issues or is not diligently enforced or 
monitored.202 For instance, a business-led community engagement 
program may foster some short-term community interests but fail to 
develop any sustainable investments that last beyond the 
corporation’s exit. This will be particularly apparent when decisions 
to foster community interests are made using the best interests of the 
corporation, not the best interests of the community. 
Similarly, without a third-party monitoring or enforcement 
mechanism, corporate attention to community interests is left purely 
to the goodwill of the corporation.203 Should it choose not to foster 
community interests or do so only in a peripheral manner, it will not 
face any sanctions for its non-compliance. Finally, for those 
corporations wholly uninterested in furthering community interests, 
a self-regulatory program for community interests ensures that they 
can continue their status quo. 
Self-regulation thus offers the benefits of individualized 
solutions, flexibility, greater firm commitment to fostering 
community interest protection, lower costs, and an opportunity to 
align community interests to business strengths. At the same time, 
self-regulation can lead to community investments that are neither 
substantive nor sustainable. Even worse, self-regulation will also not 
sanction corporations who eventually abandon community interest 
considerations or who wholly ignore these interests from the outset. 
 
 201. Wawryk, supra note 200, at 61. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 61–62. 
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C. A Hybrid Approach 
As both public regulation and self-regulation offer a number of 
benefits and disadvantages, it is apparent that promoting a 
Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach to corporate decision-making for 
community interests may need to adopt a hybrid regulatory 
approach. Public regulation, for instance, can be used to create an 
enabling environment for corporate consideration of community 
interests, while self-regulatory practices can be used to allow 
corporations to determine how best to meet the principles of the 
public regulation. 
More specifically, broadly worded regulations that mandate 
corporations to both consider and foster community interests should 
be promulgated at both the national and the international level.204 
Regulations can further prescribe that the determination of the 
interests of the community should be made through a corporate-
community collaborative process, which requires corporations to 
“identify” or engage with all members of the community including 
those from marginalized or vulnerable groups. 
At the same time, the regulations need not prescribe the 
methods by which corporations must consider or foster community 
interests or specify the details of the collaborative process. Instead, 
the regulations should prescribe a list of non-compulsory best 
practices for both activities. These could include elements by which 
identification is fostered, such as requiring the corporation to locate 
a representative in the local community, as well as guidelines on 
establishing an effective dialogue process with the community. 
Corporations would then be able to self-determine how they will 
comply with the overall principles of the regulation. Finally, to 
incentivize corporations to adhere to regulations in this area, 
corporations should be required to disclose how and when they have 
both considered and fostered community interests as part of their 
annual disclosure obligations under domestic securities law.205 
 
 204. While this Article focuses on regulations at the national level, binding regulations 
could be introduced at the international level in provisions in bilateral investment treaties or 
free trade agreements. For an overview on these agreements, see Barnali Choudhury, 
Democratic Implications Arising from the Intersection of Investment Arbitration and Human 
Rights, 46 ALTA. L. REV. 983, 985–89 (2009). 
 205. See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (2006) (discussing 
disclosure obligations for annual reports). 
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A hybrid approach to regulating corporate consideration of 
community interests is, however, less applicable for those areas where 
the potential impact of a corporation’s activities on the community 
are irreversible. An example of an irreversible area is a toxic chemical 
spill that could lead to a public health crisis reminiscent of the 
Bhopal disaster.206 For these types of community interest areas, the 
continuum of regulation from public to self-regulation should lean 
more heavily toward public regulation. Public regulations could, 
therefore, for pre-determined irreversible areas, condition operating 
permits or licenses on ex ante community “consent.” Corporations 
would be required to disclose any of their activities that could cause 
irreversible harm to the community. The community would then be 
able to respond in one of three ways: negotiate ex ante compensation 
for this activity; require that the corporation demonstrate how it 
intends to minimize the possibility of this activity and the method by 
which compensation would be calculated if, despite precautions, 
harm still arises; or refuse the corporation permission to conduct this 
activity in its community. 
Regulating a Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft approach to decision-
making using a hybrid approach offers several of the benefits 
provided by public regulations and self-regulation. Corporations will 
not incur high indoor management costs as they can promote 
community interests using their established forms of organization. 
They can also promote those community interests that align with 
their business strengths, benefitting from a synergistic approach. At 
the same time, while governments still incur the costs of designing 
the regulation, they do not incur any monitoring costs, and 
enforcement costs are low as government officials already review 
securities documents for this type of information. As a result, no new 
enforcement mechanisms are necessary. 
Conversely, using public regulations primarily to regulate 
community interest areas that can suffer irreversible damage ensures 
the protection of these areas regardless of corporate interest in the 
matter. While it is more expensive than self-regulation, binding 
regulations further ensure that the community plays an active role in 
ex ante determining its fate. 
Both approaches, however, suffer from three main limitations. 
First, as under either approach corporations are not required to 
 
 206. For an overview of the Bhopal disaster see supra notes 30 and 62. 
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satisfy all community interests, critics may argue that community 
interests are not meaningfully addressed.207 Yet as corporations are 
required to “identify” or collaborate with communities to determine 
the interests they will foster, it is more likely that by working with 
the community, the corporation will choose at least some interests of 
significance to the community. Moreover, use of a Gesellschaft-
Gemeinschaft approach to decision-making favors, as the decision-
matrix earlier considered indicates,208 areas that both foster a 
community’s sustainable development and enhance a corporation’s 
operating environment. Accordingly, choosing to foster issues of 
significance to the community is already built into this model. 
Second, under the hybrid approach, compliance with this 
regulation will likely be induced only if the sanctions for non-
compliance are high. The Securities and Exchange Commission 
[SEC] has not, however, been particularly vigilant about sanctioning 
corporations for failing to adhere to disclosure rules. For instance, in 
relation to rules for disclosing diversity policies for board member 
nominating committees, the SEC has observed that corporate 
compliance with this rule has been “spotty”209 but has not indicated 
that corporations that failed to adhere to the rule will face any 
repercussions. A similar approach has been observed for corporations 
that failed to adhere to climate change disclosure rules.210 Still, 
despite lax enforcement, disclosure rules requiring corporations to 
demonstrate how they have considered and fostered community 
interests can offer benefits by way of the expressive function of 
law.211 In particular, by formulating a rule requiring corporations to 
 
 207. This limitation may be less relevant for the non-hybrid approach as it is likely that 
irreversible areas are meaningful areas of interest for a community. Still, the government may 
limit the interests it considers irreversible to only a few areas. If so, this criticism may still 
equally hold true for the non-hybrid approach. 
 208. See Table 1 supra Part II.C.1. 
 209. Elisse B. Walter, SEC Commissioner, Remarks at the DirectWomen Board Institute 
(Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch021011ebw-2.htm (“[T]he 
corporate track record for disclosure under this new requirement is quite spotty so far.”). 
 210. See Suriya Jayanti, Failure to Launch: Insights from The Issuance and Non-
Enforcement of the Securities And Exchange Commission’s “Commission Guidance Regarding 
Disclosure Relating To Climate Change”, in PROC. OF THE 9TH INT’L CONF. ON ENVTL. 
COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 275 (2011), available at 
http://inece.org/conference/9/proceedings/34_Jayanti.pdf; Sarah Johnson, Does the SEC 
Care if You’re Green?, CFO.COM (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.cfo.com/articl
e.cfm/14550880. 
 211. For an overview on the expressive function of law, see Cass R. Sunstein, On the 
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engage with communities, law can express the social value of 
protecting community interests and can work towards propelling 
normative changes in corporate behavior.212 
In addition, for those corporations that do comply with SEC 
rules, despite lax enforcement, disclosure rules on community 
interest consideration can effect substantive changes in corporate 
behavior.213 One commentator has colorfully described the effect of 
disclosure rules on corporate behavior by noting that “if every 
instance of adultery had to be disclosed, there would probably be less 
adultery.”214 More specifically, as disclosure rules in this area require 
a corporation to analyze in detail—perhaps for the first time—its 
practices of considering and fostering community interests, the 
process of disclosure can raise management’s consciousness about 
the corporation’s practices in community interest areas such that 
improvements to behavior result.215 
Third, under the non-hybrid approach, costs to both the 
government, in implementing and enforcing the regulation, and 
corporations, by way of indoor management costs, will be high. 
Moreover, pre-determining particular community interests that must 
be satisfied limits—but does not completely obviate—the ability of 
the corporation to link its business strengths to community interests. 
However, since most communities face only a few irreversible 
interests, the scope of this regulation should be relatively narrow. By 
limiting the scope of the regulation, costs should, therefore, 
be contained. 
 
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996). 
 212. The law’s expressive function results in norm changes as a result of internalization of 
the norm, through a process of shaming, or by becoming a focal point to which others 
gravitate towards. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 210; Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of 
Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000); Elizabeth S. Anderson & 
Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 
(2000); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 
(2000). 
 213. See BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 55, at 223. 
 214. A.A. Sommer, Jr., Therapeutic Disclosure, 4 SEC. REG. L.J. 263, 265 (1976). 
 215. Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage 
What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1342–52 (1996); Merritt B. Fox, Required 
Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 113, 123 (1999). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Tönnies, it appears, was shortsighted in his view of the disparities 
between corporations and communities. The notion of a corporate-
Gemeinschaft need not be abominable. On the contrary, as the small 
number of corporations already fostering community interests 
suggests, a corporation-community can be a laudable idea, not the 
least because it generates mutual benefits for both the community 
and the corporation. 
Nevertheless, the most important aspect of governing corporate-
community relations is the need for corporations to identify or 
interact with their operating community. Without this requirement, 
corporate consideration of community interests can easily turn into a 
meaningless public relations exercise or an exercise in paternalistic 
behavior. Indeed, as the case studies evidence, fostering sustainable 
improvements to a community, which can simultaneously benefit 
corporations, only occurs after a corporation has been able to view 
itself, even if only partially, as part of the community. 
Yet despite the advantages of transforming corporate-community 
relations from antagonistic to harmonious in nature, it is unclear why 
there are only a few efforts at promoting good corporate-community 
relationships. While certain industry associations, a handful of 
countries, and a few international organizations have taken steps 
towards promoting links between corporations and their operating 
communities, certainly more could be done to facilitate this 
relationship. In this regard, the Gesellschaft-Gemeinschaft model is 
offered as one further step towards uniting the interests of 
corporations and communities. 
 
 
 
